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CONTRACTORS AND THE COST OF WAR:  







Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has led unprecedented 
efforts in outsourcing and privatization.  Empirically, private firms offer efficiency 
incentives and cost savings which are maximized in competitive markets.  Recent 
contingency operations have underscored the importance of contractors, as evidenced by 
the number and magnitude of reconstruction contracts.  In turn, utilizing private 
contractors has raised questions regarding their true cost-effectiveness.  This research 
highlights the key features of the private military industry from an economic perspective. 
After revisiting DoD’s initial objectives for outsourcing many of their traditionally in-
house roles, an assessment is made to whether current efforts are based primarily on 
capability or financially-driven constraints.  The economics of privatization are 
subsequently explored, with particular emphasis on current contracting efforts.  The 
research will provide deeper insight to contract valuation, industry competitiveness, and 
cost effectiveness arguments.  Despite their current controversies, a case is made that 
contractors are cost effective given their inherent flexibility.  The argument becomes 
stronger after considering the military’s relevant alternatives to using private military 
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A. BACKGROUND  
The issue of civilians accompanying troops on the battlefield raises unique 
considerations of economic and social policy.  In the modern contingency environment, 
multi-million dollar contracts are awarded to provide a myriad of traditionally in-house 
services including logistics, security, and weapons system support.   Historically, the 
driving argument for using private markets centered on their assumed cost effectiveness.  
Private entities offer efficiency incentives and cost savings that are maximized in free 
markets based upon the free market principles of competition and innovation.  After all, 
in market economies, government provision of basic services like garbage collection and 
education has now come into question, and has increasingly been replaced with private 
provision, though still largely paid for from tax revenues.1  Privatization within the 
Department of Defense, as it has been argued, has allowed military forces greater 
flexibility to focus on their core mission.  Proponents also cite several advantages that 
contractors can offer.  Some are technical experts that can perform tasks better than 
military personnel.   In many cases, they can relieve the effects of a manpower or 
budgetary constraint on the military.   In this regard, contractors represent a form of surge 
support.  Equipping a large standing force is not only costly, but also takes a long time to 
train.  Comparatively, a contractor’s labor costs are cheaper since they require no 
permanent staff and can avoid high fixed costs.  Private firms can also quickly reduce the 
size of their force when a job ends.   
The fact that contractors have become so integrated with the active forces has not 
gone unnoticed, however.  More recently, the terms “contractors on the battlefield” or 
“private warriors” have received a great deal of recent attention and, to some extent, a 
degree of notoriety.  To many, the term evokes notions of inexperienced gangs of hired 
guns or modern day mercenaries.  Recent allegations of pricing abuse by reconstruction 
giant Halliburton has attracted public and Congressional scrutiny.  Furthermore, the 
                                                 
1 Andrei Shleifer, “State Versus Private Ownership,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (Fall), 134.    
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widespread lack of regulation has also raised concern and criticism.  Nonetheless, the 
changing nature of warfare has clearly allowed the PMC industry to thrive.  Not only has 
the proportion of support functions has increased relative to combat troops, but the 
military has taken on more diverse tasks such as reconstruction efforts, technical support, 
and specialized training.   
In the “fog of war,” many experts have questioned the contractor’s viability in 
frontline tasks.  In the military context, poor service delivery can have serious 
repercussions on military capability.  Traditional concerns include the domestic and 
international legal status of civilians in close proximity to combat; control and discipline 
of contractor personnel; and contractor security and force protection.2  Several academic 
studies and papers have highlighted the growing trend—focusing on the legal and ethical 
ramifications relating to issues of chain of command, accountability, force protection, and 
mission effectiveness.  Few studies, however, have focused on the basic industry 
economics or cost effectiveness.  Peter Singer, a noted industry expert, asserts that “we 
often talk about it in terms of economic cost savings, but there are no proven economic 
cost savings. There is simply no comprehensive study that we can look at and say that it 
has proven to save us money.”3  To be sure, countless studies have shown that 
privatization can create cost savings within both private and public sectors.  Yet 
contracting for services in a contingency environment is a sharp contrast when compared 
to contracting for laundry services or landscaping.  In other words, one should not simply 
assume that privatization saves money.   
Several of the key features within the industry provide a useful perspective on the 
industry from an economist’s point of view.  Empirically, the Department of Defense is 
using the private market to supply an inherently public good.  Privatization and 
outsourcing efforts are seen as vital means towards achieving cost savings.  In addition to 
                                                 
2  Richard Dunn, “Contractors in the 21st Century Combat Zone,” in Acquisition Community 
Connection [database on-line] (Ft. Belvior, VA: Defense Acquisition University, April 2005); available 
from https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx? Id=22084 (accessed October 2006).   
3 PBS Frontline, “Private Warriors: Does Privatization Save Money?” [web-page] (PBS, June 2005); 
available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ warriors/contractors (accessed October 
2006).    
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the cost-effectiveness debate, there are a myriad of other issues that exist.  For example, 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) yields key insights on the issues of relationship-
specific investments, asymmetric information, and contract uncertainty.  Moreover, the 
competitiveness of these private markets is a precursor towards achieving cost savings 
and most would agree that such competition is crucial to the make or buy decision. After 
major contract awards, however, firms may be able to exercise a degree of market power.  
For major reconstruction efforts, companies such as Halliburton, its sizeable Kellogg 
Brown and Root subsidiary, MPRI, and Vinnell stand out as the only major contractors 
available to meet the government’s specialized needs.  In the wake of increased demand 
for private security services, however, there are simply too many firms to name.  
Likewise, countless other firms provide a myriad of services ranging from food service to 
weapons system support.   
There remain other costs to privatization such as quality of force issues and the 
existence of layers of subcontracts which indicates some degree of inefficiency.    The 
inherent costs are difficult to quantify, but should weigh heavily on the make or buy 
decision. Before policy-makers and commanders tailor specific policy, however, it is 
important to step back and consider how we reached this point.  More specifically, has 
the increased use of privatization been capability driven—aimed at enhancing combat 
effectiveness?  Or is it a case where active forces simply cannot meet the needs due to 
budgetary constraints?  Since the end of the Cold War, privatization within DoD has 
proceeded apace.   The fundamental question remains:  Are current outsourcing 
initiatives a cost effective use of taxpayer funds?  Most would certainly agree that no 
matter how much is spent on defense, it should be spent well.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to first explore the rise and document the trends, and 
investigate the cost effectiveness aspects of the Private Military Industry.  The research 
offers a different perspective on a growing trend within the military and will provide the 
reader greater insight to an often controversial and highly charged topic.  The paper will 
first provide an enhanced understanding of the industry dynamics and highlight some of 
the major developments in the last decade.  After revisiting the original reasons for 
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government outsourcing, an informed assessment can be made as to whether the 
government has been consistent with their original objectives or why their strategy has 
deviated.  Next, many of the economic issues surrounding the employment of Private 
Military Contractors are examined.  Of particular importance are the criteria for 
successful privatization, contracting considerations, and principal – agent considerations.  
In addition, the relevance of Transaction Costs Economics is highlighted.  Of primary 
interest is an investigation into the cost-effectiveness debate.  The economic rationale for 
privatization is made prior to addressing cost-effectiveness arguments.     Citing specific 
contracts, an assessment is made as to the types of work best suited to meet the 
government’s needs.  Finally, the reader should gain some understanding as to not only 
if, but how cost savings will accrue to the government.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The ultimate purpose of this research is to address the private military industry, as 
it exists in the current contingency environment, from an economist’s point of view.  Key 
questions are as follows: 
• How did this industry achieve such remarkable growth since the end of the 
Cold War? 
• Were the original reasons for outsourcing primarily based on 
budgetary constraints or capability constraints?   
• Are there any additional overlooked reasons that have allowed the 
PMC industry to grow? 
• What are the dominant industry characteristics? 
• How are accurate contract objectives established in such a 
subjective environment? 
• What happens to competition before and after a contract is let?  Is 
there evidence of market power? 
• Has the increased use of PMCs led to proven cost savings to the DoD? 
• What are some examples of savings to the government and 
inefficient use of public dollars? 
• In cases where DoD has successfully utilized the private market, 





The outsourcing of defense functions is treated as a public policy issue, and more 
specifically, a public procurement issue.  Thus, the research treats the outsourcing of 
military functions as a question of resource allocation, given a budgetary constraint.  
Research is undertaken with an exploratory focus.  The methodology for this research is 
to first examine the characteristics of the private military industry, as it pertains to 
contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Emphasis is placed on the historical 
precedent for outsourcing within the Department of Defense.  After the current industry 
landscape is examined, a case for defense outsourcing is made.  Economic criteria for 
effective privatization, based on both public and private viewpoints, are addressed.  
Transaction Costs Economics and agency theory are also used to address unique 
considerations within the current contingency environment.  Subsequent research focuses 
on the cost-effectiveness argument.  Specific research is devoted towards specific aspects 
of private contractors which justify contracting out.  While the aim of the research is not 
to provide specific policy recommendations, it will allow the reader to understand the 
current scope in which contractors are currently utilized.  In addition, it will provide a 
useful framework to weigh the cost advantages and disadvantages of active military 
forces versus contractors.   
E. SCOPE  
Although the growth of the industry has been global in scale, this report draws 
from contracting efforts within the Federal Government.  Emphasis is placed on 
contractors involved in current contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
industry lacks financial transparency, making quantitative comparisons difficult.  Several 
contracts, however, have proven accessible.  For example, the Center for Public Integrity, 
a non-profit, non-partisan investigative agency has received a substantial amount of 
contracts through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Within both government 
and academic communities, a substantial degree of research has been devoted towards the 
industry.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Budget 
Office have also devoted substantial resources aimed at several concerns. Additional 
literature reviewed includes DoD regulations, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) theses, 
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scholarly essays, and books.  For the purposes of this study, research will primarily draw 
from contractors operating in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).    
F. ORGANIZATION 
The project consists of five chapters.  Chapter I provides a requisite overview and 
background with key terms and concepts defined.   Chapter II and provides a background 
to the rise of the private military firm in DoD.  Although employment of private military 
contractors is nothing new, emphasis is placed on post Cold-War outsourcing initiatives.  
Recent trends and events within the industry are also highlighted.   Examples of current 
PMCs are provided, documenting the diverse range of services provided and the typical 
dollar amount and length of contracts.  Section III outlines the economics of the private 
military industry, beginning with a discussion of PMCs in the context of public goods.  
The economics of privatization are also underscored.  A discussion of Transactions Cost 
Economics and its relevance to the industry is provided.  Principal-agent and moral 
hazard issues are also highlighted.  Finally, the degree of competitiveness within the 
industry, a precursor towards cost savings, is also examined.  Section IV focuses on the 
cost-effectiveness debate.  First, a discussion of the contracting arrangements (value, 
time, specificity) is presented.  Of particular note is a quantitative assessment on the cost 
of an active duty soldier versus a PMC employee.  Subsequently, an assessment of cost 
savings is presented.  Section V represents the culmination of the study and provides the 






II. BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE MILITARY 
FIRM IN DOD 
A. INTRODUCTION TO KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
1. Overview of the Private Military Industry 
There remains some disagreement as to the exact scope of services a Private 
Military Company (PMC) provides, making the industry a bit hard to define.  For 
example, Schreier and Caparini define PMCs as “private companies that specialize in 
military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence collection, 
operational support, logistics, training, procurement and maintenance of arms and 
equipment.”4  Taken in its broadest context, therefore, this definition could encompass 
the entire defense industrial base to also include major defense contractors such as 
Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon.   After all, the production of the necessary 
means, or inputs, of war has long been left to the private market.   Yet the specific term 
PMC has evolved over the past several years and now carries a distinction that they 
supply personnel with specialized skills, often including combat experience.  Brookings 
Scholar Peter Singer, a noted industry expert and author of Corporate Warriors: The Rise 
of the Privatized Military Industry, provides an international analysis of the entire private 
military industry—ranging from small companies providing consulting services to those 
that offer front line combat services.   He uses the term Private Military Firm (PMF) to 
describe “business providers of professional services intricately linked to warfare” and 
“corporate bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills, including combat 
operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support, training, 
and technical skills.”5  Thus, firms operating within the industry are best characterized by  
 
 
                                                 
4 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, “Privatising Security: Law, Practice, and Governance of Private 
Military and Security Companies,” [report on-line] Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces Occasional Papers, no. 6 (March 2005): 2, available from http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/ 
(accessed October 2006).  Hereafter referred to as “Privatising Security.”  
5 Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), 8. Hereafter referred to as Corporate Warriors.  
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the services provided and not the company in particular.  These entities deliver a wide 
spectrum of military and security services, once generally assumed to be exclusively 
inside the public realm.    
Although the U.S. is by far the largest buyer of private military services, the 
utilization of military contractors is global in scope and activity.6  For example, many 
active PMCs, such as Armorgroup or Vinnell, are part of multinational corporations.  In 
addition, many countries are moving toward privatizing, or outsourcing, the inner 
workings of military forces—representing a fundamental change in the military 
organization as a whole.  This has re-ignited a long-standing debate on what the scope 
and role of government should be.  Much of the current controversy surrounding PMCs 
regards their use in other parts of the world.  Several scholars have singled out the 
conflict in Sierra Leone, for example, as the most dramatic use of contractors, where now 
defunct companies Sandline International and Executive Outcomes provided direct 
military advice and mercenary troops in Africa.   It would certainly be a mistake, 
however, to group all PMCs in this category.  Rather, it is emphasized that the United 
States has very few of these “full-service” firms.  Instead, the market for military support 
and private security firms is predominantly in the logistics support, private security, and 
reconstruction arenas.  Estimates of contractor support to deployed forces have indicated 
they will exceed $4.5 billion from fiscal years 2000 to 2006.7   
Both Department of Defense (DoD) and non-DoD agencies may award contracts 
to support deployed forces.  Joint Publication 4-0¸ Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint 
Operations, classifies contracts into three broad categories—theater support, external 
support, and systems support:   
• Theater support contracts are awarded by contracting agencies associated 
with regional combatant command for recurring services or for one time 
delivery of goods and services at the deployed location 
                                                 
6 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 9.   
7 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to 
Deployed Forces But Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans. GAO-03-695 (Washington D.C., June 
2003), 1, n1.  Hereafter referred to as Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces.   
 9
• External support contracts are awarded by commands that are external to 
the combatant command for services provided at deployed locations   
• System contracts provide logistics support to maintain and operate 
weapons and other systems8 
Deborah Avant, author of The Market for Force, also provides a more detailed 
description of the industry, further broken out into five sectors: military advice and 
training, operational support, logistics support, site/personal security, and crime 
prevention/intelligence.9  Several insights are noted regarding industry structure.  First, 
the site and personal security sector has the largest number of companies involved.  
Specifically, worldwide demand for security services after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks has skyrocketed.  As the insurgency in Iraq grew more violent, 
government agencies and reconstruction contractors also came to rely on the specialized 
security services.  At the same time, firms in the industry tend to represent smaller, niche 
players.  In contrast, logistics support and military advice and training have the fewest 
players indicating economies of scale and/or higher barriers to entry.  Some tasks, such as 
rebuilding infrastructure or providing logistical support require substantial resources and 
capital investment in order to win such contracts.  Secondly, there appears to be 
considerable overlap between companies, indicating that some firms have diversified into 
more than one area.  Singer notes that recent industry consolidation centers on brand 
marketing and sub-specialization that are requisite factors to competition on the global 
market and increase market share.10  As it pertains to the market within the United States, 
the military support sector is not only the largest in scope and revenue, but also the most 
varied in responsibilities.   
2. Privatizing, Outsourcing, and Competitive Sourcing 
Although the terms outsourcing and privatization are often used interchangeably, 
notable differences do exist and are clarified for the purposes of this analysis.  First, 
outsourcing is the transfer of a support function from a traditionally in-house organization 
                                                 
8 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces, 5.   
9 See Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge, 
UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10. Hereafter referred to as The Market for Force. 
10 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 83.   
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to an outside service provider.  The primary goal is to provide the same function with 
greater quality at less cost.  Thus, the workload shifts but no government assets are 
transferred to the private sector.  Most notably, the vendor retains a degree of flexibility 
and is free to utilize new technologies and business practices to improve service delivery 
and/or reduce support costs.  Of particular distinction is that the government retains 
responsibility for not only funding, but the standard of service as well.  In addition, 
Gansler notes a distinction between the terms “outsourcing” and “contracting.” Typically, 
firms use contractors when they need specialized services over a shorter time horizon.  
Outsourcing agreements, however, are typically longer term and measurement of 
performance is through assessment of some type of service level agreement, not an 
assessment of individual tasks.11  Proponents cite benefits such as improved service at a 
lower cost, increased efficiency, greater flexibility, and more rapid responsiveness to 
changing requirements.  At the same time, the contracting process can be complex, time 
consuming and costly.12  In contrast, privatization is a subset of outsourcing and occurs 
when the government ceases to provide certain goods or services.  In turn, the existing 
public entity is transferred to private ownership and the level of the government’s 
involvement is fundamentally altered.  Whereas outsourcing is the transfer of workload, 
privatization represents a complete transfer of ownership rights from the public to the 
private sector.   
The Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998 required federal 
agencies to review, inventory, and publicly list those functions that are not inherently 
governmental and that could therefore be performed by commercial activities. During the 
same time, FAIR statutorily sanctioned competition between federal agencies and the 
private sector.  As a result, a new term, called “competitive sourcing,” emerged. 
Privatization and outsourcing implicitly assume that private sector delivery is always less 
costly and is always of an equal or better quality than public sector service delivery.  
Public versus private competition, or competitive sourcing, makes no such judgment.  
                                                 
11 Jacques Gansler, “Moving Towards a Market Based Government: The Changing Role of 
Government as a Provider,” [report on-line] (IBM Center for the Business of Government, June 2003): 13, 
available from http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/Gansler_Report.pdf (accessed October 2006).   
12 Ibid., 23.  
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Rather, competitive sourcing implies competition for work between the private and 
public sector.  A summary of these relevant sourcing options is shown in Table 1: 
 
Table 1.   Summary of Sourcing Options 
 
Sourcing Approach Definition 
Outsourcing Organizational activities are contracted out 
to vendors or suppliers who specialize in 
these activities, usually in a competitive 
fashion. 
Competitive Sourcing Current public providers and private 
providers compete for the service or 
function to be provided. 
Privatization Current government capital equipment, 
facilities, and workers are moved into the 
private sector—either competitively or on a 
sole-source basis. 
 
Source: from Gansler, “Moving Towards a Market Based Government,” 10. 
 
With respect to current contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors now 
fulfill a variety of differing roles including logistics support, security, military training, 
and maintenance of weapons systems.  Most contracts are essentially a form of 
contracting-out for services, technically a subset of outsourcing.  The overriding 
consideration is that they, like other contracting-out activities, receive their maximum 
benefits—in performance improvements and cost reductions—through the presence of 
competition; and they can be acquired and terminated as the services are needed (rather 
than hired as permanent government employees—military or civilian).  The economics of 
privatization activities are more formally explained in Chapter 3.   
B. PRIVITIZATION AND OUTSOURCING AFTER THE COLD WAR 
1.   A Historical Perspective 
The U.S. government has long recognized the potential of cost savings through 
the private sector.  Within the executive agency, Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) Circular Number A-76 outlines when commercial activities performed by the 
government can instead be performed under contract for the Government by private 
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companies.  The circular mandates that the Government obtain commercially available 
goods and services from the private sector when it makes economic sense to do so.  
These functions, or commercial activities, are the only functions eligible to be performed 
under contract.  The policy is viewed by many as a catalyst for competition, increased 
efficiencies, and technological innovation.  If an activity can be performed through 
contracting or government in-house personnel, an A-76 study is completed to determine 
the most economical means of production.  Though originally established in 1966, it has 
seen several revisions.    Current policy is to allow the private sector to compete against 
the government employees for certain functions.  Grasso notes that the policy rests on 
key assumptions: 
• The federal government should not compete against its citizens but rely on 
the commercial sector to supply products and services needed by the 
government 
• The government can conduct cost comparison studies to determine who 
best to do the work through a process of managed competitions 
• Market forces can determine the most effective and cost-efficient methods 
to operate functions in both government and commercial sectors; and 
• The nature of competition within the marketplace can be self-managed and 
not require government oversight13 
With particular relevance to DoD, it has also been held that certain core functions remain 
in-house.  As outlined in the circular, these “inherently governmental” functions are “so 
intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government 
employees.”14 These functions include those activities that require either the exercise of 
discretion in applying government authority or the making of value judgments in making 
decisions for the Government.”15  Inherently governmental functions are further 
categorized by into (1) the exercise of sovereign government authority or (2) the 
establishment of procedures and processes related to the oversight of monetary 
                                                 
13 Valerie Bailey Grasso, Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy [report on-line] 
(Congressional Research Service, June 2005): 4, available from 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30392.pdf (accessed October 2006).   
14 U.S. Office of Management of Budget, Circular No. A-76 [web-page] (Washington, D.C.: 1999); 
available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/ a076/a076.html (accessed October 2006).   
15 Ibid. 
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transactions or entitlements.  Also underscored is the direction of the national defense; 
management and direction of the Armed Services; activities performed exclusively by 
military personnel who are subject to deployment in a combat, and combat support or 
combat service support roles.16   
Within the federal government, initiatives aimed at cost savings through using 
private market mechanisms have resonated through several administrations, Republican 
and Democrat alike. Ronald Reagan emphasized the view that big government was 
inefficient, wasteful, and unmanageable. Implementing market-based solutions within 
government were themes also resonated by Presidents Carter and H.W. Bush, though not 
as pronounced as Reagan’s.17  President Clinton’s National Performance Review 
articulated the idea that government should focus its attention on those activities which it 
“should and could do best, and then put incentives in place to ensure optimum results.”18  
As outlined in the Fiscal Year 2002 President’s Management Agenda, President George 
W. Bush identified competitive outsourcing as one of five management initiatives aimed 
at enhancing government effectiveness.  More specifically, the administration has looked 
at simplifying and improving the policies and procedures to a sourcing process that was 
widely viewed as cumbersome, complicated, and protracted.  As a result, Circular A-76 
was recently modified to expedite the competition process and create a more streamlined 
competition process.   
While the U.S. government has a long history of looking to the market for 
military services, DoD has been at the forefront of A-76 policy in recent years.  After 
several years of limited use, the Deputy Secretary of Defense renewed emphasis in the 
program in 1995 when he directed services “to make outsourcing of support activities a 
priority in an effort to reduce operating costs and free up funds to meet other priority 
needs.”19  Subsequently, the effort was incorporated into the 1997’s Defense Reform 
                                                 
16 U.S. Office of Management of Budget, Circular No. A-76. 
17 John Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (New York: Basic Books, 
1989), 3.  Hereafter referred to as The Privatization Decision.   
18 Grasso, Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy, 1.   
19 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Sourcing and Acquisition: Challenges Facing the 
Department of Defense. GAO-03-574T (Washington, D.C., March 2003), 6.   
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Initiative and was termed competitive sourcing (in recognition that either the public or 
private sector could win the competitions).  Arguably, current changes to the policy under 
the current Administration will also have far reaching repercussions.  In 2001, President 
Bush emphasized, “We should not be afraid of competition, innovation and choice. Our 
government must be open to the discipline of competition.”20 
Although outsourcing is certainly not a new phenomenon, DoD’s current efforts 
are unmatched in size and scope.   The department has the largest program of market-
based sourcing and has estimated savings of over $6 billion from A-76 competitions 
between 2000 and 2003 involving nearly 73,000 positions.21  Continued demands on the 
federal budget have created a renewed calling for greater emphasis on cost savings 
through greater efficiency and less red tape.  Persistent budget deficits, fiscal demands of 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and impending social security and Medicare 
shortfalls have placed unprecedented demands for DoD’s discretionary dollars.  
Outsourcing and privatization are seen as key aspects toward achieving cost savings.  
Furthermore, the services are desperately trying to recapitalize, or modernize, their aging 
equipment—languishing from the so-called “Procurement Holiday” that followed the 
Cold War.  As a result, services are now faced with much more difficult decisions as to 
the allocation of personnel, equipment, and services.  The Air Force, for example, heavily 
utilizes the private market.  Recently, it has announced it wants to trim nearly 40,000 
active duty positions by FY11, citing near term shortfalls in operations and investment 
accounts.  At the same time, contracting actions have been expanded to provide a wider 
range of services—from privatized base housing and computer network support to 
operation of the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and maintenance of the F-117 stealth 
fighter.  Since 1992, the Army has also awarded multi-billion dollar contracts for its 
logistics functions and engineering support during contingency operations through a 
contract known as Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).  The scope of 
                                                 
20 U.S. President, President’s Management Agenda (2001); quoted in Gansler, “Moving Towards a 
Market Based Government,” 8.   
21  Executive Office of the President.  Office of Management and Budget, Competitive Sourcing: 
Conducting Public-Private Competition in a Reasoned and Responsible Manner (Washington, D.C., July 
2003), 2.   
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current LOGCAP contracting includes services such as base-camp construction, food, 
fuel, housing, and supplies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in Southwest Asia.   
To emphasize, the military’s use of contractors during a contingency is not a new 
phenomenon.  Hiring contractors to support armies can be traced to America’s 
revolutionary battles.  In World War II, for example, merchant marines were essentially 
key contractor personnel—not unlike the current truck drivers supplying fuel and food to 
troops in Iraq.  Zamparelli also notes that 80,000 contractors supported 359,000 troops in 
the Vietnam Conflict.22  It was during Vietnam, however, that contractor roles began to 
fundamentally change.  As equipment became more advanced, the military relied 
increasingly on contractors as technical specialists working side by side with military 
personnel.23  In the 1970s, some observers became concerned about the military’s 
reliance on contractor support. A Defense Science Board report in 1982 noted that 
although contractor employees generally performed well during crises and combat, there 
were no formal mechanisms to ensure their continued performance.24  In the last several 
years, the PMCs’ role has evolved even further.  Specifically, the nature of their 
involvement has continued to move closer to the battlefield, the scale of their use has 
increased, and the number of companies taking part has swelled.25  In the Balkans, for 
example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported an Army uniform 
presence of 6,000 troops supported by 5,900 contractors, nearly a 1:1 ratio.26   
2. Size and Structure of Military Forces 
As a percentage of total federal spending, DoD’s share steadily declined from 
24.3% in 1989 to 15.3% in 1998, rising back to 19.5% in 2005.  Over the same period, 
DoD’s share of the discretionary budget remained relatively constant at approximately 
                                                 
22 Steven Zamparelli, “Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For,” Air Force 
Journal of Logistics XXIII (3): 12 
23 Schreier and Caparini, “Privatising Security,” 18. 
24 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, Audit Report on Civilian Contractor 
Overseas Support During Hostilities; quoted in John Campbell, “Outsourcing and the Global War on 
Terror” (Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005), 17.   
25 “Business: War and Piecework,” The Economist, 10 July 1999, 67.   
26 Stephen Blizzard, “Increasing Reliance on Contractors on the Battlefield: How Do We Keep from 
Crossing the Line,” Air Force Journal of Logistics XXVIII (1): 6.   
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48% to 50%.  Large and growing structural deficits, primarily due to demographic trends 
and healthcare costs, also lie on the horizon.  Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, 
DoD has downsized its personnel and force structure considerably.  From 1989 to 1999, 
active duty end strength fell steadily from 2.1 million to 1.4 million.  According to 
Defense Manpower Data Center analysis, today’s active force is approximately 30.4 
percent smaller than it was in 1990.27  Similarly, the Guard and Reserves have had their 
numbers reduced by over 40 percent while performing 13 times more man-days per year 
than previously accomplished.28 
 
Figure 1.   DoD Active Duty and Coast Guard Trends, 1990 - 2004 
        Source: From Defense Manpower Data Center, “2004 Demographics Report.”  
 
In the last 15 years, however, the services’ operations and support costs have not been 
proportionately reduced—anticipation of an extended peace dividend was indeed short 
lived.  Many would agree that there has been a disproportionate growth in the so-called 
“tooth to tail” ratio on the battlefield; that is, a marked escalation in the number of 
                                                 
27 Defense Manpower Data Center, “2004 Demographics Report” in Military Manpower Resources 
[database on-line] (Department of Defense, 2004); available from 
http://www.nps.edu/Library/Research/SubjectGuides; p. 4. 
28 Blizzard, “Increasing Reliance on Contractors on the Battlefield,” 7.  
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support functions relative to actual combat power.  Moreover, consumption rates for fuel, 
ammunition, and water have increased dramatically. Echevarria notes that “a division 
consumes as much today as a field army during World War II.”29 Figure 2 shows the 
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Figure 2.   DoD Spending Trends, FY 1985 – 2006 
 
Source:  Author created from Office of Executive Secretary, “Annual Report to the 
President and Congress,” in Annual Defense Reports [web-page] (Department of 
Defense, 2005): A-1, available from http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr2005.pdf (accessed 
October 2006).  
 
Even more striking is the fact that although end strength is nearly a third smaller than it 
was in 1990, personnel costs have increased as a result of heftier salaries and benefits. In 
addition, expectations that military requirements, or “ops-tempo,” would taper were not 
                                                 
29 Antulio Echevarria, “Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality: A Revolution in Military Theory,” Joint 
Forces Quarterly (Spring 1997): 32.  
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realized.30  Conflicts in Bosnia, the Persian Gulf War, and Somalia, along with the threat 
of nuclear proliferation, made it clear that the U.S. would continue to field a large 
peacetime force.  With respect to the current GWOT, members of Congress and military 
analysts have suggested the military is undermanned to meet the requirements in the post-
Cold War era, and specifically, the GWOT.     
C. CURRENT TRENDS 
1. Contracting for Service and Support Functions 
Government agencies are relying more on services to accomplish their missions.   
In recent years, DoD has spent more on services than on supplies, equipment and goods, 
despite the high cost of weapon systems and other large military items.  Within DoD, 
acquisition of services has continued to increase in scope and volume.  Between FY 1999 
and FY 2003, spending on services increased by 66%, and in FY 2003, the DoD spent 
over $118 billion, approximately 57% of DoD’s total procurement dollars on services.31  
These services belong to a very broad set of activities ranging from janitorial services to 
space launch operations.  Major categories of services include professional, 
administrative, and management support; construction, repair, and maintenance of 
facilities and equipment; information technology; research and development; and medical 
care.32  Apte et al. note several inherent characteristics that make contracting for services 
difficult.  For example, “intangibility of service outcomes” makes it difficult to clearly 
describe and quantify services, while “intangibility of outputs” makes it difficult to define 
and measure quality.33   These inherent complexities have necessitated a change in the 
way DoD contracts for services.  As we shall see in the case of a contingency 
environment, service contracts can be complex and involve multi-stage processes and 
                                                 
30 Edward Bruner, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States, [report on-line] 
(Congressional Research Service, May 2004): 1, available from http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21754.pdf 
(accessed October 2006).   
31 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contract Management: Opportunities to Improve 
Surveillance on Department of Defense Contracts. GAO-05-274. (Washington, D.C., March 2005); quoted 
in Uday Apte and others, “Managing the Services Supply Chain in the Department of Defense: 
Opportunities and Challenges,” in Proceedings from the Third Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 373. 
32 Uday Apte and others, “Managing the Services Supply Chain in the Department of Defense,” 374. 
33 Ibid., 377. 
 19
cover several years.  Thus, it is challenging to write contracts that are flexible enough to 
cover all relevant and possible scenarios.  If such contracts cannot be well defined, it may 
be preferable to deliver certain services using internal resources as opposed to 
outsourcing them.   
2. Defense Transformation 
The ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to provide insights about 
the increasingly complex and changing nature of war.  For now, it appears that the Cold 
War paradigm of large standing armies has been replaced in favor of equipping a smaller, 
more agile, and more lethal force.  To meet the new demands of the GWOT, the 
Pentagon has embarked on a comprehensive transformation effort—aimed at “creating 
and sustaining a competitive advantage in warfare.”34  Under the leadership of Donald 
Rumsfeld, an unrelenting focus on enhanced capabilities, increased efficiency, and less 
waste has resonated throughout DoD.  Rumsfeld, also a staunch supporter of market-
based sourcing, commented: 
This is not the task of any one department or country. We must all begin to 
develop new approaches. And we must increasingly think of this budget as 
but one component of a multi-faceted strategy -- combined with the 
resources allocated to other departments of the U.S. Government, plus the 
private sector. The old, rigid divisions between war and diplomacy, 
conflict and reconstruction -- the departmental roles that go with them and 
the division between public and private -- no longer serve us well.35  
As we look to the current privatization and outsourcing efforts in the post-Cold War 
world, the scale of the private military support industry has grown immensely.  From 
1994 to 2002 the DoD entered into an estimated 3,000 contracts with U.S.-based firms, 
estimated at a contract value of $300 billion.36  Proponents argue that broader 
                                                 
34 Department of Defense.  Office of Transformation, “Transformation Overview,” [web-page] 
(Department of Defense, 2006); available from                 
http://www.defenselink.mil/ transformation/about_transformation.html (accessed October 2006).   
35 Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld on the Fiscal Year 2006 Budget to House Armed Services 
Committee; available from        
http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/109th Congress/RumsfeldBudgetTestimony2-16-05.pdf (accessed 
October 2006).   
36 International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “Making a Killing: The Business of War,” 
(Center for Public Integrity, 2002); quoted in Singer, Private Warriors, 15.   
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employment of contractors creates a vehicle for cost savings, flexibility, and innovation.  
More importantly, it enables the military to do what it does best—fight and win our 
nation’s wars.  In the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the importance of 
contractors to the “Total Force Concept” is now explicitly underscored.  In short, DoD 
policy directs that “performance of commercial activities by contractors, including 
contingency contractors and any proposed contractor logistic support arrangements, shall 
be included in operational plans and orders.”37   Despite the fact that DoD uses 
contractors as part of the total force mix and recognizes the need to continue essential 
contractor services during crises, it has not included them in operational and strategic 
planning.38   
3.   Current Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
Rebuilding Iraq constitutes the largest U.S. assistance program since World War 
II.  Since 2001, Congress has appropriated nearly $430 billion to DoD and other 
government agencies for operations activities in direct support of GWOT.  In this 
analysis, current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are viewed within the purview of 
GWOT activities.   According to GAO estimates, DoD has received about $386 billion to 
fund military operations, while the remaining $44 billion was appropriated to other U.S. 
agencies (primarily U.S. Agency for International Development and U.S. State 
Department) for reconstruction and stabilization efforts.39  The funding has been 
provided through both regular and supplemental appropriations.  In the past decade, 
supplemental appropriations have also provided an increasing share of DoD’s budget 
authority, specifically for Operations and Maintenance and Personnel accounts. After 
2002, the majority of the supplemental appropriations were for funding the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and the war on terrorism. By 2005, supplemental appropriations 
                                                 
37 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, [report on-line] (Department of Defense, 
2006); available from http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/ (accessed October 2006).   
38 DoD Instruction 3020.37 outlines that contractor services are considered essential when (1) DoD 
components may not have military or civilian employees to perform these services immediately or (2) the 
effectiveness of defense systems or operations may be seriously impaired and interruption is unacceptable 
when those services are not available immediately.   
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Global War on Terrorism: Observations on Funding, 
Costs, and Future Commitments. GAO-06-885T (Washington, D.C., July 18, 2006), 2.   
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reached about 6% of budget authority—they had remained at less than 1% for most of the 
1990s.40  While traditional supplemental spending was once reserved exclusively for 
national emergencies, such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and Hurricane 
Katrina, military services have become much more dependent on supplemental 
appropriations for wartime funding of operations and personnel costs. In turn, this raises 
key issues about oversight and accountability for funds, especially when contracting in a 
contingency environment.  Considering the scale of operations in the last three years, it is 
clear that the GWOT is a much different type of conflict.  Although President Bush has 
not given a timetable for withdrawing troops from Iraq, it is likely that reconstruction 
efforts will continue for the next several years.  In turn, the importance and criticisms of 
contractors will continue to be underscored.   
After the combat phase of the 2003 Iraq War was won with fewer divisions than 
many analysts expected, it was not long after that the occupation phase placed substantial 
pressure on the military’s manpower resources.  As the first anniversary of combat 
approached, DoD was engaged in the “largest troop rotation since World War II.”41  
Shortly thereafter, all active Army divisions became involved.  Reserve Components and 
Marine Corps units soon became extended, or committed for over one year.  Many 
personnel came under stop-loss orders that kept them from leaving service.  According to 
Burns, no Army division was available as a strategic reserve as air and naval forces were 
shifted to cover key contingencies.42  In January 2004, DoD acknowledged the problem 
by temporarily adding 30,000 to the authorized active duty end strength of the Army.43  
Currently, DoD reported about 132,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed to Iraq and 
                                                 
40 Thomas Hungerford, Supplemental Appropriations: Trends and Budgetary Impacts Since 1981, 
[report on-line] (Congressional Research Service, November 2005): 2, available from 
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33134_20051102.pdf (accessed October 2006).   
41Bruner, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States, 2. 
42 Robert Burns, “U.S. Plans Extra Air Power on Asia While Ground Forces Focus on Iraq,” 
Associated Press, 19 January 2004; qtd in Bruner, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the 
United States, 2. 
43 See Bruner, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States, 2. Note that in the 
context of the legislation, “temporary” was defined as the duration of the current emergency situation in 
Iraq or four years to accomplish planned force rotation changes for the Army.   
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about 15,000 deployed to Afghanistan.44 Actively supporting these troops, however, are 
thousands of private contractors, often working behind the scenes.   
D. EXAMPLES OF CURRENT PMCS 
The conflict in Iraq has focused world attention on the role of PMCs to new 
heights and has also proved to be a very demanding testbed for them.  Though not 
noticed as much as their post-war contributions, PMCs were also prominent throughout 
the war itself.  In 2005, PBS aired an episode of its popular documentary Frontline series 
which focused on the employment of private military contractors inside Iraq.  At the time, 
current estimates of contractors inside the Iraq theater of operations included 50,000 
support and logistics contractors, 20,000 non-Iraqi security contractors, 15,000 Iraqi 
security contractors, and 40,000 – 70,000 reconstruction contractors.45  Civilian military 
contractors in Iraq currently provide an array of traditionally in-house services including:  
• Guarding officials, military installations, and supply convoys 
• Training local troops and police forces 
• Providing interrogators, translators, and transcribers 
• Maintaining and repairing vehicles and aircraft 
• Running logistics operations and supervising supply lines 
• Driving supply trucks that carry fuel and food 
• Providing warehousing and storage services 
• Maintenance of computer systems 
• Preparing and serving meals for soldiers 
• Cleaning military facilities 
• Building housing 
The Army’s outsourcing of their logistics functions provides an illustrative 
example.  Originally conceived in 1985, LOGCAP is the Army’s comprehensive logistics 
program during contingency operations.  LOGCAP’s original purpose was twofold:  (1) 
preplan for the use of contractor support in contingencies or crises, and (2) take 
                                                 
44 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Global War on Terror: Observations on Funding, Costs, 
and Future Commitments,  5.   
45 PBS Frontline, “Private Warriors: Frequently Asked Questions,” [web-page] (PBS, 21 June 2005); 
available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/faqs (accessed October 2006).   
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advantage of existing civilian resources both in the United States and overseas to 
augment active and reserve forces.46  The program has since evolved into a 
comprehensive planning and services contract.  Arguably, LOGCAP is the military’s 
lifeline in the current theater of operations.  The Army awarded the current LOGCAP 
contract (LOGCAP III) to Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) in 
December 2001.47  KBR, with roots in WWII, was vital in infrastructure building for the 
U.S. Army during the Vietnam War.  Currently, the Army uses LOGCAP to support 
military operations and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.  From 2001 – 2005, the estimated 
cost of the various task orders under the contract exceeded $15 billion. In December 
2004, LOGCAP employed 44,000 people (including a large proportion of foreign 
nationals and subcontractors).48  In addition to traditional logistics functions, KBR has 
also played a key role in building military bases and providing a range of services.  Yet 
LOGCAP is only one example.  Countless other functions are currently fulfilled by 
private contractors. Service contracts include communication services, interpreters, base 
operations services, weapons systems maintenance, gate and perimeter security, 
intelligence analysis, and oversight over other contractors.49  Contractors are also tasked 
to maintain mission-critical computer systems and networks for the Combined Air 
Operations Center, a command-and-control facility where all air operations are 
coordinated.  The Air Force also relied on contractors to support its new, high-tech 
Predator unmanned aerial vehicles.   
                                                 
46 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. GAO/NSIAD-97-63. (Washington, D.C., 1997), 2.   
47 See Donald Trautner, “A Personal Account and Perspective of the U.S. Army Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program,” [web-page] (U.S. Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, 2004); available 
from http://www.amc.army.mil/LOGCAP/.  Note that on September 11, 2001, the LOGCAP re-competition 
was already in progress.  Significant changes were made to the contract, and the definition of 
“contingency” was changed to expand the application of LOGCAP to a more direct role with regard to 
military force involvement.   
48 U.S. Congress. Congressional Budget Office, Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces 
(Washington, D.C., 2005); 4.   
49 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to 
Deployed Forces but Are Note Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans. GAO-03-695. (Washington, D.C., 
2003); 7. 
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Thus, it is useful to revisit the term “inherently governmental.”  It is apparent that 
the distinction is becoming increasingly blurred after looking at the numerous types of 
roles contractors fulfill.  Functions such as aircraft and munitions maintenance, 
communications, weapons calibration, and weapons system software maintenance are 
now prime candidates for privatization.  Furthermore, the Geneva Convention has 
outlined the specific roles of combatants and noncombatants.  Military personnel are 
classified as combatants and can be relied upon to assist and augment the fighting force, 
as well as to provide self-protection and defend equipment and terrain.  Contractor 
personnel, on the other hand, currently are classified as noncombatants and as such can 
carry a weapon only for self-protection, and then only with the express approval of the 
theater commander. In combat, the distinction becomes even less clear.  For example, 
contractors who provide logistics support in theater or who operate the Air Force’s 
revolutionary Predator unmanned aerial vehicle are vital to force effectiveness.  Fredland 
points out, “they are no less a part of a military operation than those who fire the 
weapons.”50  
The list of players in the PMC industry is as diverse as the range of services they 
offer.  Several major contractors have become well known.  In the United States, well 
known companies such as Halliburton, Blackwater, Erinys, and Triple Canopy have 
prospered in this once niche market providing everything from logistics support, security, 
maintenance of weapons systems, and training.  Furthermore, all signs point towards 
sustained long-term growth in the industry.  As weapons and equipment become more 
complex and challenging to maintain and operate, there is a greater willingness to rely on 
civilian contractors who can provide services ranging from monitoring advanced weapon 
systems to rendering technical assistance and logistical support. No longer restricted 
solely to acquisition and logistical functions, contractors will continue to accompany the 
military into war zones and into battle. 
                                                 
50 Eric Fredland, “Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the Role of 
Military Companies,” Defence and Peace Economics 15 (3): 208.  Hereafter referred to as “Outsourcing 
Military Force.”  
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Much of the recent media attention has been focused on the multi-billion dollar 
(and growing) private security industry.  Fueled by the instabilities in the region and the 
postwar construction boom, the demand for private security has intensified.  U.S. civilian 
government agencies and reconstruction contractors have had to contract with private 
security companies since it is not within the military’s mission to provide security to non 
military organizations.  Rather, U.S. Forces in Iraq provide security to contractors and 
DoD civilians who support military operations.51  In reviewing several reconstruction 
contracts, GAO recently found that the cost to obtain security providers and security-
related equipment can account for in excess of 15 percent of total contract costs.  Avant  
notes that the industry is quite diverse as evidenced by the size and age of the 
companies.52   For example, major players include American companies such as 
DynCorp, Vinnell (a Northrup-Grumman subsidiary), MPRI (an L-3 Communications 
subsidiary), and Kroll.  Blackwater USA, a well-known private security firm with 
contracts to guard U.S. State Department officials, drew attention to the entire PMC 
industry after four of its employees were attacked and killed in Fallujah, Iraq in March of 
2004.   In April 2005, six more of its employees were killed subsequent to their helicopter 
being shot down.  Both events were highly publicized and drew additional concerns from 
Congress and the public as to the magnitude and the extent to which contractors were 
utilized.  DynCorp fills a key role in the Iraqi police training program, as well as 
providing maintenance and technical support.  In addition, Vinnell, MPRI, and Nour 
USA have been involved in training and equipping the new Iraqi army.  Expenditures on 
those tasks could reach as high as $2 billion.53  KBR currently has over 24,000 
contractors in Iraq working on a multitude of projects ranging from repairing oil wells to 
handling mail, building military bases, and operating dining facilities for military forces.  
                                                 
51 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of 
Private Security Providers. GAO-05-737 (Washington, D.C., 2005); 10.   
52 Deborah Avant, “Private Military Companies and the Future of War,” [report on-line] (Foreign 
Policy Research Institute, April 2006); available from                                                        
http://www.fpri.org/ enotes/200604.military.avant.privatemilitarycompanies.html (accessed October 2006).  
53 PBS Frontline, “Private Warriors: Who Are the Contractors,” [web-page] (PBS, 21 June 2005); 
available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/ contractors/companies.html 
(accessed October 2006).   
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Some companies, such as Titan Corp and CACI International, have made substantial 
revenues furnishing translators and linguists to the Army.54 
E. SUMMARY 
Several factors including post-Cold War reductions in the size of military forces, 
increases in the operations and missions undertaken by the military, and increased 
sophistication and complexity of weapons systems attributed to the dramatic rise in 
contractor personnel supporting contingency operations.  In the wake of DoD’s continued 
emphasis on gaining greater efficiencies through cost savings, the private military 
industry has grown substantially.  Currently, contractor personnel carry out key roles 
which are vital to military capabilities.  At the same time, the expanding roles filled by 
contractors have created a gray area with regard to the term “inherently governmental.” 
Citing DoD’s aggressive use of OMB Circular A-76, it is clear that a primary objective of 
contracting has been centered on cost savings.  Cuts in military spending, competition 
between funding modernization and other programs, and a steadily declining military 
infrastructure have led Congress to order DoD to develop way of cutting costs without 
cutting services, and doing more with less.   
Aside from historical OMB and Congressional policy, however, the current use of 
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan is primarily aimed at providing the military with 
expanded capabilities.  The U.S. government has spent billions of dollars to achieve 
political, security, and economic goals in Iraq and contractors are integral to those 
objectives.  Between 2003 and 2006, over $300 billion has been allocated to stabilization 
and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.  The use of PMCs has been a defining aspect of this 
effort.  It is a complex undertaking, in an uncertain security environment, and under 
significant time constraints.    Simply put, the military is not equipped or trained for many 
of these specialized tasks.  As these service-related contracts have comprised a larger part 
of the defense budget, DoD has started to recognize the inherent difficulty in ensuring 
contract performance, especially with respect to performance and price.  In this regard,  
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economics can offer crucial insights about current privatization and outsourcing efforts.  
The economics of privatization is underscored in the next section, as are several other 
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III. THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION AND 
OUTSOURCING 
A. OVERVIEW 
Throughout the 1990s, privatization and outsourcing efforts became common 
practices within both public institutions and private corporations.  On the heels of the 
information revolution, large corporations have outsourced business functions such as 
customer service, document management and financial services.  Within government, 
outsourcing is seen as a potential solution to improve service delivery and cut costs.  
Singer notes that a so-called “privatization revolution” went hand in hand with 
globalization—both trends embraced the idea that comparative advantage and 
competition maximize efficiency and effectiveness.55   
As we have seen, several reforms have been aimed at improving the efficiency of 
the government and generating cost savings.  From DoD’s perspective, successful 
privatization and outsourcing are critical towards equipping, modernizing, and 
transforming the force to meet the challenges of the GWOT.  Countless functions within 
DoD, like grounds maintenance, computer and network support, dining facilities, and 
base security, are now performed by thriving competitive markets.   
This section of the thesis highlights several of the key economic issues associated 
with “contractors on the battlefield.”  Throughout this thesis, in-house provision on the 
one hand and privatization and outsourcing on the other, are treated as distinct public 
policy alternatives.  Thus, the government’s role as it pertains to the provision of defense 
is first highlighted.  The empirical basis for effective privatization and outsourcing is also 
emphasized.  Next, the economics of privatization, as it pertains to the make-or-buy 
decision, are addressed.  Other key considerations, including transaction costs economics, 
agency theory, contracting mechanisms, and industry competitiveness are subsequently 
discussed.   
                                                 
55 Reason Public Policy Institute, Privatization 1997: A Comprehensive Report on Contracting, 
Privatization, and Government Reform, 11th Annual Report on Privatization, 1997; quoted in Singer, 
Private Warriors, 67. 
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Above all, it is important to note that these economic arguments provide only a 
theoretical basis on why one should expect efficiency savings.  In weighing the benefits 
of privatization and outsourcing, comparisons often involve an ideal norm and an existing 
institutional arrangement which is imperfect.  Demsetz emphasizes that such a “nirvana” 
approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the 
relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements.56  In other words, a 
relevant notion of efficiency must refer to market and institutional arrangements as they 
are, not as they could be.  For example, private markets often fail to be perfectly 
competitive and government can also compare favorably for organizing certain tasks.  
Ultimately, therefore, a comparison must be made between two imperfect modes of 
organization.   
B. THE ECONOMIC VIEW OF PRIVATIZATION 
1. The Role of Government 
Sociologist Max Weber argued that "a state is a human community that claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."57  In other 
words, the state (or government) must be responsible both for defining the conditions for 
the legitimate use of force, and also for ensuring that illegitimate violence is prevented or 
punished.   In viewing the provision of national defense, Adam Smith writes, 
The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the 
violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed 
only by means of a military force.  But the expence [sic] both of preparing 
this military force in time of peace, and of employing it in a time of war, is 
very different in the different states of society, in the different periods of 
improvement.58 
How that force should be provided, however, is debatable.  As a general rule, government 
employees typically provide most services associated with the collection of tax revenues.  
                                                 
56 Harold Demsetz, “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint,” The Journal of Law and 
Economics XII (1): 1 
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653. 
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On the most basic level, therefore, widespread use of PMCs has re-ignited a longstanding 
debate on what the fundamental scope and role of government should be.  As a result, 
before exploring the economics of privatization, it is first critical to understand the role of 
government in society.   
The provision of national defense is often cited in economics classrooms as an 
example of a pure public good.  An inherently public good is one from which each person 
benefits from its provision whether he helps pay for it or not. Such public goods, if left to 
private markets, would be undersupplied or not supplied at all.59  In turn, most economic 
arguments for government intervention are based on the idea that the marketplace cannot 
provide these public goods or handle externalities.  As Stokey and Zeckhauser note, the 
provision of public goods is one of the primary justifications for a public choice 
mechanism, and indeed for the very existence of governments.60   
Donahue adds that the choice between public and private has two dimensions, 
financing and performance.  The first dimension, financing, considers if we should pay 
for some good or service individually, out of our own resources, or if it should be paid for 
collectively with funds raised through taxation.  Most economists would agree that the 
financing of national defense must be carried out by the government.  The second 
dimension, performance, considers if the good or service is provided by a governmental 
organization or nongovernmental organization.  Even though it is our government’s role 
to provide for the common defense, it need not exclusively produce all of the necessary 
inputs to do so.  While Figure 3 provides a starting point to consider the public private 
choice, we will see that distinction often becomes much more blurred.   
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Figure 3.   Dimensions of the Public/Private Choice  
Source: From Donahue, The Privatization Decision, 7. 
 
To reiterate, the outsourcing of defense activities is not a revolutionary concept.  
Fredland notes that while the tools used to conduct defense activities are almost 
exclusively privately produced, public agencies have, for the most part, retained a 
monopoly on the use of those tools.61  Consider, for example, a major defense contractor 
such as Boeing or Raytheon producing specialized weapons systems.  Essentially, the 
U.S. government is the only prospective buyer.  As Fredland and Kendry note, there is a 
great deal of literature in professional economics devoted to the private production and 
provision of these weapons systems (a crucial input in the production of military force), 
yet privatization of military output is a “radical concept little discussed within 
mainstream economics literature.”62   
This distinction between the inputs and outputs to war has indeed become more of 
a gray area, especially with respect to current contingency operations.  Contractors have 
become vital components to DoD’s warfighting capability and are now serving in an 
unprecedented number of roles.  In turn, some have become concerned that the 
government’s so-called monopoly on the use of force is jeopardized.  For example, Avant 
argues that “privatization’s clearest effects are to enhance the importance of market 
mechanism and diffuse control to a wider variety of actors.”63   
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2. The Economics of Privatization  
Two Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics provide the basis for the 
presumption that competitive markets allocate resources efficiently.  In the absence of 
mathematical proofs, they are summarized as (1) a competitive equilibrium is Pareto-
efficient and will lead to an efficient allocation of resources, and (2), any Pareto-efficient 
allocation can be supported by a competitive equilibrium.  Thus, the first theorem 
underscores the importance of free markets—let markets do the work and the outcome 
will be desirable.  In this example, there is no role for the state in production.   
Clearly, strong assumptions must hold for these theorems to be true.  As 
Bortolotti and Siniscalco note, markets must be perfectly competitive; externalities must 
not exist; there must be no public goods; and people must be perfectly informed.64  These 
assumptions are clearly quite restrictive and, when relaxed, a case can be made for 
government intervention.  For example, some tasks cannot be organized through the 
market.  In other cases, the prices of goods and services give false signals about their real 
value.   
Instances where markets do not work perfectly, termed “market failures,” provide 
justification for government activity.  Examples of market failures include externalities, 
monopolies, incomplete or inaccurate information, and public goods.65  Thus, people 
often propose government spending or intervention when they perceive a market failure, 
meaning some result is only achievable through government rather than individual 
means.  Within this framework, defense is widely considered as a public good.   
Even if efficiency dictates that the government must provide good and services, it 
is not clear whether the government should be directly involved in the production of 
those goods versus contracting with private firms to produce the same goods in its place.  
In other words, even if government has an important role to play in the economy, such as 
providing defense, it does not follow that government must actually do the work.  
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Wheelan asserts that “government should not be the sole provider of a good or service 
unless there is a compelling reason to believe that the private sector will fail in that 
role.”66  If the bidding process is competitive, then a task can go to the firm that can do 
the best work for a given cost.  Thus, a public good can be delivered in a way that 
harnesses the benefits of the market.     
Next, consider which goods or services government should provide and which 
should be provided privately.  Neoclassical economics views national defense as a 
production process, transforming a given mix of inputs (equipment and personnel) to 
achieve a given level of output (national defense).  In turn, the purposes of such output 
can be achieved with various combinations of people and weaponry.  Stiglitz notes that in 
the case of a market failure, even if it calls for government intervention, it does not 
necessarily call for government production.  In other words, “arguments concerning the 
necessity of public provision of public goods only require government financing; that 
analysis does not speak at all to the question of whether a public good should be publicly 
or privately produced.”67  The same holds true when the government decides that 
individuals should get certain services like medical care or education.  It can pay for these 
services without producing them itself.   
Clearly, the production of certain goods needed to wage war has remained in the 
domain of the private market as exemplified by weapons systems, vehicles, and 
ammunition. Yet the “service side” of war has been understood to be the sole domain of 
government and deemed one of the most essential tasks of government.   As Fredland 
notes, privatization of military output is a “radical concept little discussed within 
mainstream economics literature and rarely practiced.”68    
Although there is nothing new about the military’s use of private contractors, the 
Iraq war has demonstrated the employment of PMCs on an unprecedented scale.  In turn, 
the Pentagon's increasing reliance on outsourcing military functions raises important 
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questions about accountability and the chain of command.  As a result, many of the 
government’s current outsourcing efforts have been met with some apprehension by top 
military commanders, policy planners, military experts, and contractors.  
In the case of government production, how will we know if goods and services 
are produced efficiently?  The incentive to operate efficiently differs between the public 
and private sectors and understanding the shortcomings of both systems is critical.  In the 
private sector, there is a strong incentive to produce efficiently because lower costs 
translate into higher profits.  The index of performance (profit) is noticeably absent in the 
public sector, as are market signals like stock prices and bond ratings.   
Government produces by arranging relationships whereby individuals and 
organizations devote resources to designated public purposes.  By its nature, government 
is an institutional process through which individuals collectively make choices and carry 
out activities.  This collective decision process—a complex interaction among voters, 
legislators, and bureaucrats—is in stark contrast to a market-based system.  First, 
fundamental aspects of the political process are clearly disadvantageous to economic 
efficiency.  Fundamental attributes of American democracy like periodic elections and 
majority rule are clear examples.  Insecure property rights in combination with separation 
of powers yields a bureaucracy that is “vastly overformalized and disabled by its own 
organization.”69 In addition, the output of government is often complex and 
controversial.  Agencies often have multiple and competing priorities such as wealth 
redistribution, regulatory considerations and, of course, political pet projects.  The private 
sector allocates resources where they will earn the highest return.  As is often the case, 
the government allocates resources wherever the political process sends them.   
In addition, it is important to note that the shortcomings of internal efficiency are 
not based on the assumption that those employees of a bureaucratic government are 
inefficient or incapable.  Rather, the emphasis is on the information and incentives under 
which managers and other workers toil.  The performance of individuals cannot readily 
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be judged, and, without private ownership, their personal wealth cannot be significantly 
altered by changes in the level of efficiency.  Furthermore, public officials spend other 
people’s money and are less likely than private actors to be conscious of cost.  The key 
question then becomes: where do we draw the line between public and private provision 
of goods?   
Theoretically, the case for privatization is strong if private-sector production of a 
given level of output is more efficient and more innovative.70  In competitive conditions, 
privatized companies tend to outperform public enterprises and potentially generate large 
efficiency gains.   As privatization takes place, management’s incentives become altered 
toward profit-seeking behavior.  In other cases, low entry barriers allow for new firms to 
enter the market and vie for contracts—a precursor towards attaining efficiency gains 
from competition.  One clear-cut example is when the outsourced service is represented 
by low economies of scale, technological simplicity, and moderate investment costs.71   
Another key aspect to privatization is flexibility.  The reason that outsourcing 
sometimes saves money is that it inspires new ideas about how to deliver a service that 
require fewer people or different materials.  Critical issues pertain to the accuracy of 
assumptions about the ease of seller access to the contract market and the ready and 
inexpensive availability of relevant contract information.72   
3. The Historical Case for Cost Savings 
Advocates of government contracting argue that private suppliers deliver public 
services at a lower cost than public employees do.  At the same time, critics of 
government outsourcing believe that the quality of service delivered is inferior to that 
delivered by public employees.  Within government, several studies have shown that 
carefully managed privatization, under the right circumstances, can effectively provide 
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specialized expertise, save money, and result in improved service delivery.  Nearly thirty 
years ago, for example, a GAO study comparing federal agency efficiency with private 
firms handling medical and insurance claims found that it costs the government nearly 
twice as much as it cost private insurance carriers to process each claim.73  In that case, 
cost results were explained by higher government salaries and lower government 
productivity.  Many other studies have shown that cost savings of 20 to 30 percent have 
been achieved when contracting out for other services like health care, police, prisons, 
garbage collection, and utilities.74   
With respect to DoD, results have been mixed.  In 1984, GAO reviewed 235 
service-support contracts and found that, on average, competitive contracting saved the 
services 22 percent.75  Furthermore, the GAO noted that public suppliers also displayed 
substantial efficiency gains when faced with competition from private rivals.  As Gansler 
points out, “the conclusion one might reach is that when the public sector is forced to 
compete, they are able to do the same work just as well, or better, than before the 
competitions, but with significantly fewer people—in fact, frequently with 20 to 40 
percent fewer people.”76  In several other studies, GAO believed savings were occurring, 
but consistently noted that they were difficult to quantify.  As a result, DoD has been 
often been chided for its overly-optimistic estimates of cost savings.77   
Specifically, the Department has regularly boasted that competitive sourcing has 
attained cost savings ranging from 20 percent to 39 percent for activities ranging from 
logistics support to weapons system maintenance.  In another example, the Department 
                                                                                                                                                 
72 Elliot Sclar, You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2000), 8.   
73 Steven Rhoads, The Economist’s View of the World (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 70. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Department of Defense Commercial Activities 
Program (Washington, D.C., 1986); quoted in Donahue, The Privatization Decision, 68.   
76 Gansler, “Moving Towards a Market Based Government,” 51. 
77 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award 
Procedures and Management Challenges. GAO-04-605 (Washington, D.C., 2004) and Rebuilding Iraq: 
Continued Progress Requires Overcoming Contract Management Challenges. GAO-06-1130T 
(Washington, D.C., 2006).   
 38
estimated savings from competitive sourcing at near $9 billion from FY97 to FY05.   To 
achieve these savings, most private agencies cut costs by reducing their workforce, 
operating with fewer managers, and downgrading positions.  Notable exceptions when 
the government did not save money were for more complex and hard-to-specify 
services—arguably the type of reconstruction contracting currently occurring in the Iraqi 
reconstruction effort.  In reviewing logistics support contracts during the 2003 – 2004 
timeframe, for example, GAO found that LOGCAP use in Kuwait and Iraq was not 
adequately planned and noted that military commands exhibited little concern for cost 
considerations.  Given the lack of adequate planning and contractor involvement, two key 
ingredients needed to maximize LOGCAP support and minimize cost—a comprehensive 
statement of work and early contractor involvement—were missing.78   
Generally speaking, Army personnel have given favorable reviews of KBR’s 
performance in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Middle East.  Greenfield and Camm 
note that “the Army has been getting what it needs, though it may, at times, have 
accepted more cost-related risk than necessary to get it.”79  The Army’s initial experience 
in contracting for logistics support under LOGCAP I is a good example.  Contracts for 
support services represented over $2 billion of approximately $13.8 billion spent on 
Balkan operations through March 2000.80  Under the cost-reimbursement contract, the 
government articulated the contractor’s function in results required rather than the 
methods of performance of the work.  In this type of contractual arrangement, the 
government does not provide detailed specifications and work descriptions.  Empirically, 
these types of work statements give the contractor a greater degree of freedom to use the 
latest commercial practices and techniques to meet requirements successfully.  Due to the 
nature of the cost-reimbursable contract, KBR was given significant latitude on how tasks 
could be performed.  In reviewing the operations of KBR in Bosnia, GAO subsequently 
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noted that the Army needed to provide greater oversight to verify matters relating to 
economy and efficiency.81  Specifically, the contractor had little incentive to control 
costs—it would be fully reimbursed for expenses and was guaranteed an award fee.   
Due to the nature of these cost-plus award fee contracts, they require significant 
government oversight to make sure they are meeting needs in the most economic and 
efficient method possible.  Despite these cost concerns, evidence has shown the 
government did attain some degree of cost savings.  For example, a comprehensive 1997 
Logistics Management Institute study found that KBR completed work using 6,766 
employees and costing $462 million that would have taken the Army 3,918 soldiers and 
$638 million.  In this case, most of the cost savings came from labor costs and these cost 
savings were achieved by using lower-paid host country nationals.82   In a separate GAO 
report, the U.S. Army reported savings of $200 million under the contract (roughly ten 
percent of the $2 billion contract ceiling) by reducing labor costs, reducing services, and 
closing or downsizing camps that were no longer needed.83   
Clearly, a strong case can be made that competitive sourcing can save money.  
Yet, is there evidence that contract costs ever materialize into the services’ Operations 
and Maintenance (O&M) or Research and Development (R&D) accounts?  To the extent 
that support and personnel costs can be reduced, available future defense dollars could be 
used for modernization or other important defense priorities.  In a more recent study of 
DoD’s competitive sourcing efforts, RAND analysts Susan Gates and Albert Robbert 
found that personnel cost savings are indeed “real and long-lasting.”84 In reviewing six 
competitive sourcing efforts, the authors found that for every personnel dollar DoD spent 
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to obtain a given level of service before competitive sourcing, winning bidders promised 
to provide the same level of service for only 41 cents to 66 cents.85  To achieve those 
savings, every private sector and DoD winner of competitive sourcing reduced its 
workforce, sometimes significantly. Compared with their pre-competitive sourcing 
personnel counts, winners of A-76 efforts were able to provide a specified level of 
services after competitive sourcing with workforces that were some 25 percent to 60 
percent smaller.  This allowed A-76 winners to flatten their organizations, operate with 
fewer managers, and create more efficient operations, relying on fulltime workers rather 
than on personnel who at any moment could be called away to other military 
assignments.  At the time they analyzed the competitive sourcing winners, organizational 
cost savings measures had been in place one to ten years.  Each achieved the personnel 
cost reductions that had been touted during the A-76 competitive bidding process.  
Furthermore, each has been able to maintain those savings, with only minor fluctuations, 
in the years since. 
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSACTIONS COSTS    
1. Transactions Cost Economics Defined 
As we will see in this section, much of the current debate surrounding military 
outsourcing often ignores the transactional complexity inherent in contracting 
arrangements.  The transaction cost economics (TCE) approach is directly applicable to 
military make versus buy decisions.  TCE seeks to determine if it is in a firm’s best 
interest to contract for a specific function or if it is more economical and efficient to 
produce such goods or services internally.    
The decision to buy or sell in a market is accompanied by certain costs that cannot 
be avoided if a market transaction is to take place.  These costs of engaging in trade or 
exchange in the marketplace are called transaction costs.  Such transaction costs are 
indeed a fundamental reason firms come into existence, as highlighted by economists 
Ronald H. Coase and Oliver Williamson.  As previously discussed, potential buyers must 
have access to market information, which may involve substantial costs.  At the same 
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time, the contracting process might entail significant negotiations.  Furthermore, costs are 
incurred to monitor performance of the contract.   
An analysis of transaction costs provides crucial insights to the firm’s make or 
buy decision.  As Thompson and Formby note, “when trade and exchange in the market 
entail high transaction costs, performing an economic activity inside the firm may be a 
more efficient method of accomplishing an objective than by relying solely on exchange 
and trade between individuals.  If firms are more efficient at either production or 
transactions than individuals they become economically viable and have social 
purpose.”86   
Typical transaction costs faced by organizations when dealing with outside 
suppliers include source selection, periodic competition and renegotiation, contract 
management, and monitoring performance.87  These transaction costs are, in turn, 
primarily influenced by uncertainty and frequency of recurrence.  Therefore, the less 
complex a transaction, the easier it is to write an enforceable contract that covers relevant 
contingencies.  As a result, good candidates for outsourcing are those with little in the 
way of specific assets, where the task is well defined, easy to measure, and not subject to 
change, and where there are several competing suppliers.88  Additionally, price and 
performance are market driven.  Alternatively, transactions that involve a non 
standardized service, and must take place in a bilateral contract setting, are more 
challenging outsourcing candidates. 
Perhaps the most important, yet most difficult to understand, transaction cost is 
asset-specificity, or more precisely, relationship-specific investments.  The importance of 
these costs is underscored in subsequent sections and examples that follow; thus they 
bear particular attention.  To reiterate, asset specificity refers to the degree which an asset 
that is used to support a transaction can be redeployed to alternative uses without loss of 
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productive value.  More simply, asset specificity refers to the extent to which a party has 
made investments in an asset or set of assets which are "tied in" to a specific two-way or 
multiple-way business relationship.  Some relationship-specific investments, including 
some of those relevant in the context of military contractors, are not investments in 
“assets” in the traditional sense.  For example, the military’s investment in training a 
soldier is an investment that is specific to the relationship with that particular soldier—
the investment has no value to the military if the relationship is severed.  However, it is 
not really an investment in a fixed, capital asset.  To be sure, employees are often 
considered “assets,” but investments in training are typically not recognized as being 
“asset specific.”  In this context, however, relationship-based investments are particularly 
important in viewing the inherent differences between military forces and private 
contractors, especially when analyzing cost-effectiveness arguments.  These transaction 
costs are more formally explained in Chapter IV.   
Two brief examples from the government’s perspective will underscore the 
importance of transaction costs.  First, consider the upkeep of an installation’s 
landscaping.  It is a short-term and specific task in a market with many competing 
suppliers.  Since the task is well defined, measuring performance is also straightforward.  
From the perspective of both sides, demand uncertainty is limited in the short term 
(seasonality) and long term.  In this case, the contractor is not required to invest in assets 
that are tied to the requirements of this particular job, nor does the government need to 
incur any fixed investments that are specific to the particular contractor. Thus, there are 
no significant relationship-specific-investments required of the contractor or the 
government.  Thus, landscaping represents an excellent candidate for outsourcing.  
Alternatively, developing new weapons systems, like the Air Force’s new F-22 fighter as 
an example, is a specific task encompassing several years and billions of dollars.  There 
are fewer major contractors qualified for award of a major acquisition program, and those 
that are must make substantial relationship-specific investments in capital and equipment 
that is specific to the particular weapons system.  Similarly, the government’s investment 
in the project are also relationship-specific in that the technical knowledge that the 
contractor acquires during the development process can not easily be transferred to 
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another contractor if the government ever becomes dissatisfied with the initial contractor.  
Thus, both sides become, to a significant degree, “locked in” by investments that are 
specific to the relationship. Risk is partly offset via specialized contracting mechanisms 
at different phases in the program.  These contracts can be lengthy, detailed, and 
expensive, and management will require extensive oversight because performance is 
difficult to measure.  As evidenced by heated contract disputes, asymmetrical information 
will often exist—at some point, either the contractor or DoD will feel taken advantage of.  
The challenge, therefore, is to write a contract with enough precision to encourage 
desired performance, but allow enough flexibility to accommodate adjustments as 
circumstances require.   
Whereas private firms offer incentives which are maximized in competitive 
markets, some have argued that public agencies are better at ensuring a degree of loyalty 
and trust to the nation state.  Economist Oliver Williamson applied the general TCE 
framework to explain why a public agency may be appropriate for organizing some tasks 
and inappropriate for others.  He underscores “sovereign transactions,” defined as those 
tasks for which “public authority is deemed necessary, for which loyalty to the state is 
fundamental, and which may pose implications for the security of the state.”89  Where 
public transactions are concerned, he extends the original set of transactional attributes 
(asset-specificity, uncertainty, frequency), with an additional characteristic termed 
“probity.” With probity, Williamson refers to the loyalty and rectitude with which certain 
public transactions are to be discharged.90  More specifically, probity implies a high 
standard of integrity, to include professional excellence, in the organization to which a 
task has been assigned.  To make clear in what respect sovereign transactions requiring 
probity differ from other transactions, Williamson cites Wilson’s observation that the 
government itself organizes such transactions not because the “government is cheaper or 
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more efficient, but because it alone embodies the public’s authority.”91  From a 
contractual standpoint, “probity transactions” are long-term and highly incomplete, while 
demanding loyalty to leadership and mission, as well as process integrity.  Williamson 
argues that, among feasible alternatives, the public bureaucracy is the most efficient 
organization for delivering sovereign transactions.  In this regard, therefore, the author 
notes that the term “sovereign” is consistent with what was previously characterized in 
Chapter II as “inherently governmental.”  In addition, Fredland notes that “low-powered 
incentives, characteristic of public bureaucracy, are actually desirable, because they deter 
employees from being non-compliant and adventurous.”92  In turn, the primary purpose 
of administrative controls, such as rules, regulations, and standard operating procedures is 
to promote probity in mission, responsiveness, and communication.93   
Most would agree that troops directly engaged in conflict would qualify as a 
sovereign transaction, as would a fighter pilot or battalion commander.  However, 
Williamson’s characterization of “sovereign” does leave some room for interpretation.  
For example, where would a truck driver delivering critical supplies fit in?  Moreover, 
consider the roles of hired maintenance staff or security guards.  To be sure, loyalty and 
compliance towards the mission will certainly be very important for these types of tasks 
but in all likelihood, the government will want to trade off some degree of risk to obtain 
some cost savings.  Probity will remain important, but it is of a lesser concern.  In these 
cases, a contract can be tailored to suit the needs of the government and provide an 
incentive for a contractor to take on the job.  At the same time, contracting for 
traditionally in-house services is often complex and that is where we next turn our 
attention.   
2. Contracting on the Battlefield: Why Incentives Matter 
Even in peacetime, generating quantifiable requirements for weapons systems and 
services can often be difficult.  It should follow, therefore, that a contingency operation 
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makes the contracting environment much more uncertain.  Contracting for tactical roles 
involves inherent elements of complexity, uncertainty, and opportunism.  An element of 
uncertainty arises in writing contracts covering a range of unknown and unknowable 
future contingencies.  Inevitably, the contract will be incomplete—creating an 
opportunity for either side to take advantage of one another.  Thus, a basic understanding 
must exist between the contractor and the government to ensure that the contractor will 
be held accountable for service regardless of the threat level and that the contractor has 
adequately trained personnel available to meet all contingencies. Therefore, the 
government must provide an incentive for the PMC to assume risk.  The threat of 
uncertainty may be partly offset by utilization of cost-plus contracts, under which risk is 
shared jointly between the contractor and government, or target-cost-incentive-fee 
contracts, which incentivize price performance.  More importantly, firms would have 
incentives to default on those parts of the contract which are difficult and costly to 
specify and enforce; and such behavior could have serious repercussions on military 
capabilities. In the event a contractor could renege, the government is extremely 
vulnerable to hold-up.  In April of 2004, for example, a KBR truck convoy was 
ambushed, leaving six drivers killed and one taken hostage.  As Martin Smith of PBS 
reported, several truckers subsequently refused to drive until security had improved.  In 
turn, the military’s re-supply capacity was greatly diminished.  According to Smith, “the 
military was left with dwindling stores of ammunition, fuel and water.”94  Thus, the 
actions of a handful of employees, as evidenced by the “threat” to withdraw or renege, 
could pose a serious threat to military capability.   
Successful contracting depends on the government’s ability to foster competition, 
develop clear contract specifications, and carefully select the best provider.  In this 
regard, a key consideration is whether the contractor’s profit motive will improve quality 
and/or reduce costs.  To ensure it obtains the best price possible, the government usually 
resorts to competitive bidding—contractors tell the government the price at which they 
are willing to deliver, and the government purchases from the lowest bidder.  A variety of 
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contractual arrangements are available to DoD and its contractors, typically depending on 
the product or service provided.  The government’s objective is to negotiate a contract 
type and price that will result in reasonable contractor profit and provide the contractor 
with the greatest incentive for efficient and economical performance. The larger the scale 
or more complex the transaction, the greater the perceived contract risk.   
Contracts are generally grouped into two broad categories: cost-reimbursement 
contracts and fixed-price contracts.  Cost-reimbursement type contracts are suitable for 
efforts “when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be 
estimated with sufficient accuracy.”95 As a result, the government will incur a greater 
degree of cost and performance risk.  Types of cost-reimbursable contracts include: cost-
contracts, cost-sharing contracts, cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts, and cost-plus-award-
fee contracts. Major reconstruction efforts in Iraq have primarily utilized cost-
reimbursement types of contracts in which the government has agreed to reimburse the 
contractor for “all reasonable and allowable costs incurred in performing the work.”96  In 
contracts to repair the Iraqi oil infrastructure and support the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, the government has also included an award fee provision under which the 
contractor can earn an additional profit for meeting set targets in specified areas, such as 
schedule and cost control.  In contrast, fixed-price contracts are typically used when 
overall risk is “minimal or can be predicted with an acceptable degree of certainty.”97  
These contracting conditions will exist in instances where there is limited uncertainty and 
complexity.  In the case of fixed-price contracts, the risk is placed on the contractor—the 
government’s price will remain fixed regardless of the costs incurred.  At the same time, 
this assumes that the contractor is entitled to any excess profit based on whatever type of 
savings it can generate.  Cost reimbursable contracts appear to be the most appropriate 
choice for contracts where contractors are in a volatile battlefield environment and where 
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circumstances and requirements are dynamic.98  If circumstances eventually dictate, it 
may be viable to adopt a fixed-price contract, thereby shifting more of the risk to the 
contractor and further developing the definition of requirements.   
In the context of a dynamic, uncertain contingency effort, the distinction between 
different contracting mechanisms is important.  In this analysis, it is assumed that the key 
issue for the military is cost, and it might be thought that fixed price could still yield 
greater savings for the military, even in the presence of uncertainty, due to the incentive 
effects.  In reality, however, the risk aversion of the contractor will mean that the 
contractor will demand a greater risk premium the greater the uncertainty, and therefore 
fixed price contracts will actually not only be inappropriate but also more expensive, on 
average, in such environments.  For example, a risk neutral contractor should be willing 
to accept any offer greater than $2 million for a job that has an a priori probability of 50% 
of costing $1 million to perform and 50% of costing $3 million to perform (including the 
opportunity cost of capital).  In reality, however, risk aversion (both behavioral and 
practical due to liquidity concerns) would induce the contractor to demand a fixed price 
of perhaps $2.5 million for such a job.   If the uncertainty were reduced, keeping the 
expected cost the same (for example, 50% chance of costing $1.5 million and 50% 
chance of costing $2.5 million), the risk averse contractor would demand a lower fixed 
price.   
There are important exceptions to these traditional contracting arrangements.  
Contracting for services and support in a battlefield environment is rarely that clear-cut, 
and it takes time to undergo a competitive bid.  Faced with the uncertainty as to the full 
extent of rebuilding Iraq, therefore, the government authorized contractors to begin work 
before key terms and conditions (including price) were defined.  This approach allowed 
the government to initiate needed work quickly, but resulted in additional costs and risks 
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being borne by the government.  These indefinite delivery contracts establish only basic 
terms of the contracts in advance, requiring the government to issue subsequent task or 
delivery orders for specific services or goods.  Subsequent orders must be within the 
contract’s scope, issued within the period of performance, and within the contract’s 
maximum value.  Until contract terms are well defined, however, cost risk for the 
government remains.  More specifically, any delays in finalizing contracts makes cost-
control incentives much less effective since there is less work remaining to be 
accomplished and, therefore, less cost to be controlled by the contractor.  Arguably, these 
factors can also distort the accuracy of original bidding, since follow-on costs will be 
negotiated afterward.  From an economic point of view, this can lead to “rent-seeking,” 
whereby, a contractor will aim to bid low on an initial contract in anticipation that follow-
on contracts will be awarded.99  In this case, contractors will have less incentive to 
innovate or cut costs, as their contract will grant them an effective monopoly for a given 
period of time.  The issues of relationship-specific investments are also highlighted in the 
specific context of follow-on contracts.  In particular, there is often very little 
relationship-specific investment by the military at the time of initial contract award 
(given alternate potential suppliers and in-house capabilities at the time), suggesting few 
transaction costs.  At the subsequent stage, however, the alternate potential suppliers will 
be significantly behind the existing supplier on the learning curve and the in-house 
capabilities may no longer exist since the function was outsourced.  Thus, there is often a 
delay in the relationship-specificity of such an investment and the hold-up threat is much 
more significant at the follow-on stage. 
Once a contract is awarded, managing it also poses a challenge.  Oversight and 
accurate cost reporting can be difficult in DoD’s peacetime acquisition system.  With 
thousands of contracts awarded in the last decade, a dedicated cadre of procurement 
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professionals is needed to oversee the initial source selection, contract management, and 
performance monitoring.  Thus, adequate numbers of trained staff must be available to 
plan contracts and monitor contract delivery.  Without proper oversight, service delivery 
cannot be assured and costs cannot be confirmed, let alone contained.  The lack of 
oversight over contractors is currently a major cause for concern.  In one recent report, 
GAO noted that DoD lacked the capacity to provide an experienced acquisition 
workforce, directly hindering oversight efforts.100  The problem was exacerbated by 
frequent turnover among troops and a steadily increasing workload.  As a result, DoD has 
frequently found itself relying on contractors to help manage and oversee the work of 
other contractors.101  In one example, the Army has delegated much of the oversight role 
for its private security contractors in Iraq to Aegis, a fledgling British-based private 
contractor.102  Another report cited that “increased demands on the workforce have led to 
vulnerabilities in contract pricing and competition.”103   
3. Summary 
In a traditional make-or-buy decision, the decision rule is a matter of comparative 
direct production cost analysis, as evidenced by current A-76 criteria.  It appears that, 
over the last decade of outsourcing, government criteria have been aimed at achieving 
cost savings based on production cost savings.  In reality, however, a relevant 
comparison should also incorporate a thorough analysis of transactions costs.  When the 
make-or-buy decision involves complex and specialized services, it must also consider 
the unique range of transaction costs as shown in Figure 4: 
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Figure 4.   Transaction Cost Economics Framework 
 
Source: Francois Melese and Raymond Franck, “A New Guide to Government’s 
Make-or-Buy Decisions: Leveraging Transaction Cost Economics” (Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Defense Resources Management Institute, 
Working Paper Series, 2005), 11; available from  
http://www.nps.navy.mil/drmi/workingpapers.htm (accessed November 2006). 
 
 
These costs, including source selection, contract management, performance 
monitoring, and relationship-specific investments can negate a significant portion of the 
production cost savings involved with outsourcing.  In a long-term situation, a tradeoff 
must be made as to why the capability should not exist in-house versus whether a private 
firm can offer superior service.  Other important costs relate to the “middleman” 
argument.  Typically there are several layers of contracts and subcontracts.  While this 
provides the government an advantage by shifting some risk to a large prime contractor 
(such as Halliburton, Parsons, or Dyncorp) it can also offset efficiency gains.  
Accompanying each layer are profit margins for each contractor—potentially leading to 
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higher costs to the government.  Relationship-specific investments are also an important 
consideration, especially with respect to labor.  This will be explored more thoroughly in 
the next chapter. 
Finally, contracting for transactions that are long term, highly incomplete, and 
require loyalty to leadership and mission pose several difficulties.  Empirically, the 
economic incentives of profit-seekers will be vastly different from those incentives found 
within government institutions.  From a more practical standpoint, it is also difficult to 
create and oversee a contract that will cover a wide range of uncertainties.  Sovereign 
tasks are further characterized by an additional attribute termed probity—implying a high 
standard of integrity to the organization which the task is assigned.  In some cases, 
however, the government will want to trade off some degree of transactional risk to 
obtain some cost savings.  Probity will remain important, but it is of a lesser concern.  In 
these cases, a contract can be tailored to suit the needs of the government and provide an 
incentive for a contractor to take on the job.   
D. PRINCIPAL AGENT – MORAL HAZARD ISSUES 
When contracting for a service, several concerns will usually exist:  Will the job 
get done properly?  How can we monitor the performance of the contractor?  Finally, 
how will we know if we are overcharged?  With a military source, a commander can use 
the standard “command-and-control” mechanisms to induce the military agent to 
perform.  With a contract source, however, a commander can only ask for things 
identified in a predetermined scope of work and can ask only through a contract officer.  
Some worry that using a contract source on the battlefield will exacerbate the principal-
agent problems inherent in any agency relationship.  Therefore, the agency relationship 
bears an important relationship to the make-or-buy decision.   A principal, in this case the 
government, commissions an agent (the contractor) to perform a service on the 
government’s behalf.  The challenges that a principal faces when trying to induce its 
agent to do something the principal wants done is a contractual hazard inherent in any 
user-provider relationship.  As evidenced by current contingencies, there is inherent risk 
in safety, cost, and even completing the task.  Earlier in the chapter, inherent differences 
between profit-seeking contractors and civil servants were examined: “profit seekers, in 
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exchange for a price, deliver a product; while civil servants, in exchange for a wage, 
agree to accept instructions.”104  The nature of the task determines whether private 
contractors or civil servants will be most effective.  The commander will want a 
contractor to perform in a manner consistent with ensuring mission success at a 
reasonable cost.  At the same time, tension will always exist between a state-sponsored 
military and a PMC that is driven primarily by considerations of profit maximization. 
Key elements of government policy also exacerbate risks inherent in the user-
provider relationship.  This can have implications for mission success as conditions 
become more uncertain or chaotic.  Ultimately, neither a contractual obligation nor 
financial inducement may be sufficient to ensure performance on the battlefield.  As risks 
rise, contractors will have stronger incentives to renege.  This has raised concerns that 
service providers will no longer be able to provide certain services deemed critical for 
mission success.  After the Vietnam War and with the implementation of the All-
Volunteer Force in the 1970s, some observers became concerned about the military’s 
reliance on contractor support. A Defense Science Board report in 1982 noted that 
although contractor employees generally performed well during crises and combat, there 
were no formal mechanisms to ensure their continued performance.  Essentially, this is a 
classic example of a contractor being able to “hold up” the military.  Consider the 
repercussions if KBR cannot deliver critical supplies to the theater.  Obtaining the 
requisite military support may take a substantial amount of time, and finding replacement 
contractors could be cost prohibitive.     
E. COMPETITIVENESS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY 
Few decision makers would be interested in privatization unless private firms 
could achieve superior efficiency.  Voluminous literature has been devoted towards 
answering the question why profit-seeking organizations are more productive.  
Competition is an important prerequisite for achieving efficient production and low cost.  
Private, competitive firms can typically reduce costs through innovations and 
improvements, relative to government agency production.  As a result, the number of 
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contractors directly influences contractor efficiency.  Recall that in the past several years, 
DoD has increasingly relied on service-oriented contractors to provide everything from 
global logistics support to weapons maintenance.  In Chapter I, several insights were 
noted regarding industry structure.  To reiterate, the site and personal security sector has 
the largest number of companies involved.  At the same time, these firms in the industry 
tend to represent smaller, niche players.  For many of these smaller private security firms, 
soaring demand has turned Iraq into a growing market.  In contrast, logistics support and 
military advice and training have the fewest players, indicating economies of scale (or 
scope) and/or higher barriers to entry.  Some tasks, such as rebuilding infrastructure or 
providing training assistance require substantial resources and capital investment in order 
to win such contracts.  Of additional importance is the fact that several large companies 
have recently acquired smaller firms, essentially as a move to diversify their business 
offerings.   For example, Blackwater has dealings in military advice and training, 
operational support, and site/personal security.  Similarly, Vinnell provides operational 
and logistics support, technical services and training programs, and subcontract 
management.  As it pertains to the market within the United States, the military support 
sector is not only the largest in scope and revenue, but also the most varied in assigned 
responsibilities.  Despite a substantial growth in the number of small security contractors, 
the number of large support contractors continues to diminish.   
Insights as to the competitiveness of the industry are also gained from the types of 
contractual arrangements utilized.  For new contracts, the federal law generally requires 
use of full and open competition, but permits use of sole-source or limited competition 
awards in certain circumstances.  These include when contracts need to be awarded 
quickly or when there is only one supplier.  Thus, lack of competition is sometimes 
explicit, as evidenced by reconstruction contracts awarded on a no-bid basis.  KBR’s 
“Restore Iraqi Oil” contract was a program designed to get the country’s oil flowing 
quickly to finance reconstruction.  The $2.5 billion contract was awarded without 
competitive bidding.  The government justified that the company was simply the only one 
capable of handling all of the unique challenges, including oil-well fires and pipeline 
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breakdowns.105  According to The Economist, the Pentagon’s confidence was rewarded:  
KBR restored production to pre-war levels three months ahead of schedule.106    
F. SUMMARY 
Debates on military outsourcing involve questions about why government 
contracts out some activities and undertakes others in-house and what the limits of 
private sector activities are in defense.  Answers to these questions should be based on 
the unique benefits and costs of private firms and public agencies. Comparisons often use 
an ideal model of a perfectly competitive firm compared with an inefficient public sector 
or vice versa.  In reality, the relevant comparison is between two imperfect systems 
where both modes of organization are flawed.107  Note that both modes are flawed in 
both theory and practice (and sometimes the flaws observed in practice are not 
necessarily predicted, or at least not inherent, in the theory).  As it relates to current 
privatization and outsourcing efforts, therefore, a comparison should be made between 
two modes of organization, each with its own shortcomings.  Indeed, just because an 
organization exists within the government does not mean it is inefficient.  Economic 
theory helps explain why both market forces and public-sector action fail to meet the 
criteria for ideal efficiency.  Deficiencies of either sector will often be more or less 
decisive, depending on the type of economic activity.   
Private firms will offer efficiency incentives that are maximized in competitive 
markets.  In other cases, efficiency incentives are of secondary importance.  Some tasks 
will require a high standard of integrity and loyalty to the mission—those jobs are 
characterized as requiring probity.  Contracting for tactical roles involves elements of 
complexity, uncertainty, and opportunism.  Private firms will have incentives to default 
on parts of a contract which are difficult and costly to enforce.  Inevitably, the contract 
will be also incomplete—creating an opportunity for either side to take advantage of one 
another.  As Williamson notes, “all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete 
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because of bounded rationality and opportunism.”108  Therefore, the government must 
provide an incentive for the PMC to assume risk.  The threat of uncertainty may be partly 
offset by utilization of cost-plus contracts, under which risk is shared jointly between the 
contractor and government, or target-cost-incentive-fee contracts, which incentivize price 
performance.  In the event that a contractor could renege, the government is more 
vulnerable to hold-up. In a tactical military environment, however, mission attainment 
will be most crucial.  In sum, using contractors versus military forces presents an 
important tradeoff.  The military will ultimately want to ensure mission success, but at 
the same time, will want to get the biggest “bang for the buck.”    As a result, this leaves 
plenty of room for certain military functions to be performed by private agencies.  Using 
private firms to attain cost savings is not a panacea because of the associated lack of 
competition, long-term contracts, and inadequate oversight.   Alternatively, the case for 
government intervention is stronger for some tasks than for others.  If property rights 
cannot be well enforced, market arrangements often result in economic inefficiency.  
Other factors that weaken the case for market-sector allocation include lack of 
competition, external costs and benefits, public goods, and poor information.   
Contracting will create additional transaction costs.  Requirements have to be specified; 
competitions have to be organized; contracts must be specified and awarded to the 
contractor.  The inherent cost in writing, enforcing, and monitoring contracts which will 
deliver services of required quality can be substantial.   
Becoming increasingly reliant on PMCs during conflict raises questions 
pertaining to the sovereign use of force.  Empirically, government is using the private 
market to supply a public good.   Within the commercial sector, the defense industrial 
base has long been recognized as the suppliers of America’s military. Yet the increasing 
roles and tasks to which contractors are assigned are unprecedented.  As contractors have 
expanded in size and role, some media, government watchdog groups, and scholars are 
concerned that the government’s so-called monopoly on the use of force is threatened.  
For example, Schreier and Caparini argue that if security continues to be privatized, the 
dynamic will fundamentally change the role of the state, which will no longer command 
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the core function of providing security as a public good but will become one of several 
potential suppliers.109  Ultimately, however, the government will still call the shots.  It 
should be re-emphasized that under an outsourcing arrangement, the government remains 
fully responsible for the provision of affected services and maintains control over 
management decisions.  By its nature, contracting also creates risks inherent in a 
principal-agent relationship.  The principal (government) and the agent (contractor) will 
have different goals and values.  The principal-agent issue, in turn, will concern military 
commanders.  Unless those goals and values are aligned through proper monitoring and 
incentives, the principal and agent can work at cross-purposes, endangering the success 
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IV. EXAMINING THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF PMCS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This research began by asking a key question:  Are private contractors a cost-
effective use of taxpayer dollars?  In the previous chapter, an economic framework for 
privatization was first highlighted, as well as several important considerations relevant to 
the military’s make-or-buy decision.  This chapter addresses the considerations for a cost 
comparison between active military forces and contractors.  As we begin this chapter, 
first consider the meaning of cost effectiveness.  What does it mean to be cost effective 
and what are the requisite conditions to achieve it?   Simply stated, cost effectiveness 
refers to lowest cost methods to achieve desired outcomes.  An outcome may be more 
cost effective than another if it costs less or generates a greater output for a given level of 
inputs.  Clearly, war itself is costly—not only with respect to current spending, but also in 
long term costs such as budget deficits, worn-out equipment, and veterans support.  The 
seemingly exorbitant salaries paid to contractors in Iraq—reportedly as high as $90,000 
per year to drive a truck—have led many critics of government outsourcing to question 
the true cost effectiveness of using contractors instead of military personnel.  While 
media observations often ignore the true cost of military personnel (who receive tax–free 
benefits like healthcare, housing, education and retirement pensions), one should not 
immediately assume that using contractors saves money.  By the same token, contracting 
is not always analogous to so-called “war-profiteering.”  In this regard, the relevant 
alternatives to military outsourcing must also be considered.   
As an important qualifier to this section, it should be noted that the majority of 
current war-related contracting information is neither publicly available nor easily 
obtained.  The Center for Public Integrity, a self-proclaimed “nonprofit, nonpartisan 
organization devoted toward investigative journalism in the public interest,” has obtained 
a range of defense contracts through Freedom of Information Act requests.110  In 
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addition, key insights into the current contracting process and relevant audits were 
obtained through several GAO and CBO reports.  Relative costs are highly dependent on 
the circumstances and one must do more than simply compare salaries in order to 
determine comparative cost.  While a comprehensive conclusion relating to the overall 
cost effectiveness of contractors on the battlefield is difficult to make, this analysis 
outlines some of the key factors necessary to base such a comparison. 
B. ARE CONTRACTORS MORE COST EFFECTIVE?   
The most powerful argument for shifting roles from public sector establishments 
to the private sector is that doing so will achieve cost savings.  Equipping a large standing 
force is not only costly, but also takes a considerable amount of time.  In the United 
States, for example, there is already a certain amount of resource and industrial capacity 
subsidized as surge capacity, and there is also a large force of reserve manpower paid to 
train periodically that is available upon emergencies.   Although not formally placed in 
the same category as the Reserves or National Guard, private military contractors have 
become an essential part of this surge capacity.  Based on their roles in the past two 
decades, it is clear that the military cannot go to into battle without them.  Recall that 
there are about 132,000 U.S. military personnel deployed to Iraq and about 15,000 
deployed to Afghanistan.  Estimates of the number of private military contractors in Iraq 
have varied, mostly due to the overall lack of transparency within the industry, however 
many place the number at around 20,000 to 25,000, while some estimates exceed 40,000.  
While the actual numbers could vary, the analysis that follows assumes a total force of 
150,000 military troops and 30,000 private contractors—representing about 17 percent of 
the combined force. 
Perhaps the greatest strength of the PMCs is the inherent flexibility they offer in 
the form of surge support.   Most of the time, forces train while weapons and equipment 
are in place and idle, essentially waiting for contingency.  In theory, contracted firms do 
not need a large permanent staff and when a job ends, they can quickly reduce much of 
their workforce.  Simply put, that is the essence of a bilateral contract—a prospective 
contractor will agree, for a price, to provide a service for a limited amount of time.  While  
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contractors are hired and paid only if and when they are needed, military personnel are 
usually employed on a permanent basis and spend most of their time training to keep 
their skills current.   
Such flexibility means contractors might be able to deploy to the wartime theater 
more rapidly than could support units from the reserve component, which contain two 
thirds of the Army’s logistics personnel.111  The contractor may be able to respond more 
rapidly because the process of activating reserve component units is time-consuming.  In 
addition, military units generally transport their own equipment to the wartime theater, 
often via strategic sealift ships, whereas the contractor may be able to purchase much of 
the required equipment (such as trucks) in the theater itself or in adjoining countries.  
During Operation Desert Shield (1990-1991), reserve component units that were 
activated to support active component combat forces did not arrive in-theater until about 
200 days after the operation began.  Response times improved during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom: the average lag between activation of reserve-component units and their arrival 
in-theater was 158 days for full battalions and about 60 days for smaller detachments.  In 
contrast, the LOGCAP contract requires that performance begin as early as 15 days after 
the Army notifies the contractor to proceed with a particular task order.112 
In addition to the inherent flexibility they offer, private companies do not bear the 
same up-front fixed investment costs in obtaining their human capital.  Many of the 
contractors have had previous military training and service provided at the taxpayer’s 
expense.  In turn, some argue the contractors unfairly profit from the taxpayer’s 
investment in military training when they hire previously state-sponsored forces.  This 
brings forward a contentious point:  whereas a state’s military might invest substantial 
resources to recruit, train, and retain each individual soldier, PMCs can obtain the exact 
same services from a former soldier on the open market and yet incur none of the same 
fixed costs.  Singer argues that “the fact that costs of training have already been borne by 
state institutions means that these costs are borne elsewhere in society.”113  These 
                                                 
111 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces, xi.   
112 Ibid.  
113 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 74.   
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concerns, however, are overstated.  In reality, the costs of training a service member are 
sunk costs, and should not bear any relevance whatsoever to the military’s decision 
whether to contract for the services of that (now former) service member once he is 
employed by a private firm.  Because the sunk cost of training is not recoverable, the 
relevant comparison is the price of an individual trained by the military (and still under 
service obligation) versus the price of the outside option. 
At the same time, the cost of human capital investment for a PMC is not 
negligible because, although they do not do the training themselves, they will have to pay 
for the military training that its employees have already received in the form of higher 
salaries.  Even though the contractor will not need to devote resources (time and money) 
to train employees, it is necessary to pay a wage that fully incorporates the value of the 
training.  In other words, the PMC avoids the fixed costs of training that the military must 
incur, but must pay a higher variable cost for the more valuable human resource that the 
military has created. Consequently, this raises questions as to the contractor’s true 
comparative advantage in obtaining labor.114  
There are important caveats.  Although contracting out may be efficient for some 
functions, it may be costly or inefficient for other functions.  In particular, functions for 
which there are extensive costs involved in setting up, monitoring, and enforcing 
contracts could make outsourcing a poor option.  Critics of outsourcing also point to the 
inflexibility of contracts that require military commanders to issue change orders to the 
contract for even minor shifts in tasks.  Avant notes that the more the U.S. insists that 
contractors do exactly what the military does, the more it limits their flexibility.115  
Without such flexibility, the use of contractors can actually increase costs.   
 
                                                 
114 The degree to which the PMC must pay higher salaries is dependent upon the level of competition 
for the services of former military employees. Only if the PMC is a monopsonist in the market for military 
trained individuals can it expect to pay much less than the full value of the training. Clearly, there will 
always be at least one other buyer the services of such individuals – the military itself.  Note that this means 
that growth in the PMC industry and/or the number of PMC firms will force contractors to pay higher 
salaries, thus diminishing any comparative advantage in obtaining labor.  A shrinking or consolidating 
PMC industry, on the other hand, would have the opposite effect.   
115 Avant, “The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force,” 155.   
 61
C. A FRAMEWORK FOR COST COMPARISON 
1. Introduction 
In many cases, there are difficulties in comparing costs and benefits.  The 
traditional cost benefit analysis, for example, emphasizes making difficult tradeoffs 
between monetary and non-monetary values.  In contrast, cost effectiveness analysis aims 
to provide a way to measure programs with the same or similar benefits and ask which 
produces those benefits at the least cost.  Two scenarios that warrant evaluation of cost 
effectiveness include when (a) costs of alternative projects are identical and benefits need 
to be compared, or (b) when benefits are identical and only costs need to be compared.116  
If we revisit the assumption that the military exists to serve certain, predetermined roles 
(projecting force, defending the homeland, or humanitarian assistance), then the relevant 
comparison is simply between the use of a contractor or military troops to achieve the 
same goal.  In other words, simply consider the cost of a contractor providing security 
versus the cost of an active duty soldier doing the same job.  Assume that, in this case, 
legal considerations, ethical ramifications, and potential risks inherent in their use are 
secondary considerations in this illustration or are equal across alternatives.   
2. Estimating the Costs of Military Personnel 
Arguably, people represent the military’s greatest asset.  Without their hard work 
and heroism, discipline and personal courage, even the finest technologies cannot defend 
us.  By the same token, they are also relatively expensive assets.  In FY2007, DoD will 
spend nearly $110 billion on military personnel, or about one quarter of its $489 billion 
discretionary budget authority.117  Commensurate with the structure of an all-volunteer 
military force, DoD must offer a compensation package that is competitive with those in 
the civilian sector and that adequately rewards service members for the risks and rigors of 
military life.  Hartley points out that an all-volunteer force is costly to recruit, train, and 
retain, since military personnel require salaries which are higher than the civilian sector 
                                                 
116 Stokey and Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis, 153-154.  
117 See “Budget of the United States Government” in GPO Access [database on-line] (Washington, 
D.C., 2006); available from.  http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy07/pdf/ budget/defense.pdf (accessed 
November 2006). Note that the Operations and Maintenance account is the largest component of the budget 
at $152 billion.  As a further comparison, DoD’s budget for Procurement is $84 billion; Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation is $73 billion; and Military Construction is $12.6 billion.   
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to persuade them to accept the disadvantages of military employment.118  Thus, positive 
compensating wage differentials exist to provide an incentive to do dangerous work and 
reward workers who accept such jobs by compensating them more than their 
counterparts.   
Within the previously outlined TCE framework, the importance of relationship-
specific investments is emphasized for both the government and the service member.  
From the government’s perspective, equipping and training its force represents a 
substantial relationship-specific investment—each soldier represents tens of thousands of 
dollars.  More importantly, military-specific training has little value in alternative uses.  
DoD is able to allay some of this risk by requiring troops to incur an additional service 
commitment for specialized training and offering an attractive salary and incentive 
package.  The military is willing to make relationship-specific investments in its troops 
not only because they are under long-term contracts, but also because the deferred benefit 
compensation plan creates additional incentives for the service members to stay in the 
military for a longer term.  At the same time, the service member is developing human 
capital that may be of little value to outside employers, and thus the service member is 
making a relationship-specific investment of his time (and the value of outside 
opportunities) during his years in the military.  Long-term military employment contracts 
provide security to both sides. 
The true cost of an active duty soldier is not easily ascertainable and largely 
depends on the circumstance.   For example, a typical corporal might earn only $25,000 
on an annual basis.  From a practical standpoint, however, this grossly underestimates the 
true cost of a service member.  The Congressional Budget Office estimated that in 2002, 
the average active-duty service member received a compensation package costing about 
$99,000.119  This was broken out further by cash compensation and non-cash benefits.  
Of particular note is that non-cash compensation represents nearly 60 percent, or $56,000 
of the military pay package.  This includes the accrued costs of retirement pensions and 
                                                 
118 Hartley, “The Economics of Military Outsourcing,” 199. 
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other deferred benefits that service members receive after they leave active duty, such as 
retiree health care and veterans’ benefits.  The figure also reflects 12 percent for 
installation benefits, to include subsidized in-kind goods and services such as 
commissaries, family housing, and child care.  In contrast, cash compensation, including 
basic pay, allowances for housing and subsistence, special pay and bonuses, comprises 
the other 40 percent, or an average of $43,000.120 
Secretary Rumsfeld, in March 2006 testimony relating to Iraq and Afghanistan 
Supplemental funding, estimated an average yearly cost of $90,000 to sustain a service 
member in-theater.  Other analysts have frequently used the proxy “annual operational 
cost per soldier,” whereby the total war-related operational costs and obligations are 
divided by the number of deployed troops.121  Depending on annual obligations and 
troops levels, this measure yields an operational cost per troop ranging from $257,000 to 
$463,000.122  This cost clearly overstates the true costs per soldier, as operations and 
support costs are primarily driven by military equipment and other major construction 
efforts.   
3. Estimating the Costs of Contractors 
Recent attention has been devoted to the “sticker shock” associated with the 
employment of military contractors.  Stories of exorbitant salaries paid to contractors 
have fueled skepticism as to their true cost effectiveness.  Certain aspects of the labor 
market imply that when compared to the military’s recruiting process, market forces will 
influence to a greater degree the PMC’s supply and demand for labor, as well as the 
market clearing wage for a specific type of job.  PMCs must compete with each other and 
                                                                                                                                                 
119 Carla Tighe Murray, Military Compensation: Balancing Cash and Noncash Benefits, [report on-
line] (Congressional Budget Office, January 2004): 2, available from      
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/ doc4978/01-16-DoDCompensation.pdf (accessed October 2006).   
120 Ibid. Note that it is important to recognize that the above costs are only “compensation” and 
“benefits” to the service member, not costs to the military.  Specifically excluded are training costs. 
121 Secretary Rumsfeld in hearing before Senate Appropriations Committee, Supplemental Budget 
Request for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 9 March 2006; qtd in Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 [report on-line] (Congressional 
Research Service, September 2006): 31, available from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf 
(accessed October 2006).   
122 Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, 
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also with the “inside alternative” offered by military units.  The private military industry 
is generally not capital intensive, and one of the key aspects is access to qualified human 
capital.  Labor input is relatively cheap and widely available, both in international and 
local markets.  Specifically, contractor employees may be U.S. citizens, host country 
nationals, or third country nationals, depending on the type of service being provided 
under the contract.123  Contracts to support complex weapons systems, for example, 
usually require U.S. citizens, while contractors that provide food, housing, janitorial, or 
construction services frequently hire local nationals or third country nationals.  Private 
security companies often rely on ex-military personnel from Western armies.   Military 
consulting companies primarily select their employees from the ranks of retired military 
personnel who bring “useful knowledge and a sturdy willingness to endure risk.”124  As a 
result, some companies can provide specialized forces in a shorter time than the military.   
As with the military, wages paid by private companies will also have to reflect the 
harsh working conditions and dangerous environments an employee will likely 
encounter.  Contractor employees, too, will demand a risk premium in their 
compensation.  Compared with the regulations under which the DoD employs military 
personnel, the regulations under which contractors work generally give them more 
flexibility in setting pay and benefits and in hiring and firing workers.  Because 
contractors need not make long-term commitments to their employees, they are in a better 
position to “surge” to meet a short-term demand for workers and then rapidly downsize 
later.  In contrast to the military, contractors are not bound by military or civil service pay 
tables or by legislative caps on various types of special pay and allowances, although 
some contractors may offer limited benefits.  Furthermore, this allows contractors and 
their employers a greater opportunity for a performance-based pay scheme.  Contractors 
can also recruit internationally, which means they have access to a broader labor force.  
Thus, the labor supply for a contractor is relatively more elastic when compared to the 
                                                 
123 A host country national is an employee of a contractor who is a citizen of the country where the 
work is being performed; a third country national is an employee who is neither of citizen of the United 
States or the host country.   
124 Doug Brooks, “A New Twist on a Long Military Tradition,” Boston Globe, 19 October 2003.   
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military’s labor supply.125  As we will examine, this holds key implications in a 
comparison of the relative costs of active forces versus contractors. 
The cost of a PMC employee has been the subject of widespread scrutiny, with 
some security guards earning $400 to $600 per day and with members of some elite units 
rumored to clear nearly $1,000 per day.  A typical contractor in Iraq, for example, would 
expect to gross $135,000 working 270 days per year.  Doug Brooks, president of the 
International Peace Operations Association, emphasizes that $700 is closer to the high 
end of the wages and argues that, in reality, most personnel earn much less.126  In a 
recent report to Congress, GAO estimated that security providers earn between $12,000 
and $33,000 per month, depending on whether they are guarding high ranking 
government officials, guarding vehicle convoys, or providing building security.  It is also 
important to contrast the profile of cash and non-cash benefits.  Whereas nearly 60 
percent of an active duty soldier’s salary is in the form of deferred, non-cash benefits, a 
private contractor will not need to provide a deferred form of compensation for its 
employees.  Thus, the contractor will compensate its employees primarily with cash. 
Cash pay (versus in-kind benefits) is also more efficient in an economic sense because 
cash provides employees maximum discretion in how they spend their compensation—it 
gives employees more control over spending choices.127   
                                                 
125 The price elasticity of supply measures the relationship between change in quantity supplied and a 
change in price.  It is formally defined as the percentage change in quantity supplied divided by the change 
in price, holding all other factors constant.  Note that the size of the market does not always indicate the 
relative elasticity of the market. There could be a very small (large) supply of individuals with a particular 
skill set and yet that supply could still be very elastic (inelastic).  Also, the nature of the labor supply for 
PMCs can vary dramatically from low-skilled positions (truck drivers) to high-skilled positions (private 
security). 
126 Doug Brooks, “Making A Killing in Iraq?” [web-page] (International Peace Operations 
Association, September 2004); available from http://ipoaonline.org (accessed November 2006).   
127 See Murray, “Military Compensation: Balancing Cash and Noncash Benefits” and Cindy Williams, 
“Paying Tomorrow’s Military,” Regulation 29, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 26- 31.  Studies have shown that the 
cost to the military of providing these deferred benefits is greater than the value of these deferred benefits 
as perceived by the service members.  In other words, the military could take 90% of the money it is 
investing for deferred benefits each year, give this money instead as immediate cash benefits to its service 
members, and both the service members and the military would both be better off (a Pareto efficient 
improvement).  The military would save money and the average service member would at least feel as if he 
is receiving higher compensation for his services (though a net present value calculation would show 
otherwise).  This ignores the retention effects of the deferred benefits, however, which may have efficiency 
implications in terms of encouraging valuable relationship-specific investments.  
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At the same time, contractors must also pay for insurance.  Compared to military 
personnel, the marginal costs of PMCs are more affected by insurance costs because they 
are insuring only for war time.128 In particular, defense contractors and sub-contractors 
are federally mandated to buy accident and health insurance for all employees, including 
foreign nationals. As the external environment has grown more uncertain, contractors are 
spending a greater proportion of their operating costs on insurance.  While insurance rates 
for military troops are set, PMCs must pay a premium when they deploy personnel to 
risky areas.  As the Iraqi context looked more dangerous than expected at the beginning 
of the war, insurance rates soared and those costs were then passed on to the government.  
In some cases, insurance rates have doubled.  From 2002 to 2004, for example, the 
annual premium to insure around 100 staff doubled from $8,000 per worker to $16,000 
per worker, for an individual policy worth $200,000.129  Assuming a security contractor 
was at the highest end of the scale earning around $25,000 per month, the new insurance 
premium represents approximately five percent of gross wages, an increase of about 2.5 
percentage points.     
4. Summary 
Focusing exclusively on financial (rather than ethical or legal) considerations, 
utilizing contractors is indeed a cost-effective use of tax dollars.   The strength of 
contractors lies in their ability to provide specialized services more rapidly and for a 
shorter period of time than the military could do with an equivalent increase in the overall 
size of its force.  Thus, the structure of a PMC can provide a clear advantage over the 
military by offering flexibility and speed. Because contractors need not make long-term 
commitments to their employees, they are in a better position to “surge” to meet a short-
term demand for workers and then rapidly downsize later.  Even though some of this 
advantage could be countered by the use of part-time reserve forces or elite Special  
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Forces units, it would only be in the exceptional circumstance of a near permanent large-
scale deployment that contractor support would not be cheaper in the long term than the 
military alternative. 
The wages of an active duty soldier versus a comparatively trained private 
contractor reflect several important differences.  First, a service member’s salary is 
weighted more heavily towards deferred, non-cash compensation, whereas a PMC will 
provide a salary comprised entirely of cash.  Next, contractors can recruit internationally, 
which means they have access to a broader labor force.  Similarly, companies often 
employ foreign nationals or third-country nationals for a diverse number of tasks.  As a 
result, comparisons of a typical active duty troop versus a private contractor may not be 
entirely valid.  The fact that PMCs need not pay their employees retirement benefits is a 
primary issue in the cost effectiveness debate and provides the contractor a comparative 
advantage in obtaining labor.  At the same time, it should be noted that, like free trade, 
the decision to accept a certain type of work is based on voluntary exchange.  Although a 
contractor’s cash pay is economically more efficient than the military’s non-cash 
compensation, the relevant comparison is still the price of an individual trained by the 
military versus the price of the outside option.  Even though the PMC will not have to 
devote the same resources as the government to train its employees, it will still need to 
pay a wage that fully reflects the value of training and experience that might have been 
obtained from a state-sponsored military organization.     
D. ALTERNATIVES AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS   
1. Overview 
It remains clear that the unprecedented and widespread employment of military 
contractors will continue to have far reaching effects on how the military organizes, 
equips, and executes missions.  To reiterate, the military’s make-or-buy decision is a 
public procurement issue.  Thus, in simplest terms, Congress and DoD should provide the 
same level of capability at the least cost.  Yet, as we continue to hear frequent criticisms 
about the Pentagon’s so-called “shadow force” or “hired guns,” noticeably absent are 
viewpoints highlighting the relevant alternatives.  Clearly, military outsourcing can 
provide substantial opportunities for cost savings, but it is not the only option available 
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for efficiency improvements.  For example, if contractors can purchase trucks in theater, 
it is not clear why military units cannot do the same.  Moreover, if such in-theater 
purchasing is preferable, then any of the trucks that were previously described as sitting 
“idle, essentially waiting for contingency” are wasted resources.  If it is assumed that the 
military has the appropriate equipment at home, then we must also consider the 
opportunity cost of owning such equipment in the event that either a contractor or the 
military unit itself instead purchases equipment in-theater.  Moreover, it may also be 
possible to rent trucks or equipment in theater until military-owned equipment arrives.  
This would seem to be an option available to either a contractor or a military unit. 
The military could reduce the cost of deploying soldiers by extending tours of 
duty.  Such a proposal would face opposition, as it would likely reduce troops’ quality of 
life and morale.  This, in turn, would have long-term repercussions on recruiting and 
retention.  Alternatively, the services could rely more on their “traditional” surge support 
of National Guard and Reserve forces.  It should be noted that, on an incremental basis, 
however, deploying reserve forces is comparatively more expensive than deploying 
existing active forces since DoD must pay reservists special combat pays as well as pay 
them full-time rather than part-time salaries.  For active duty troops, the only additional 
war-related costs are special combat pays.  More importantly, increasing reliance on 
Reserve forces would likely face fierce political opposition, especially considering the 
unexpected and unprecedented degree of Reserve deployments over the past three 
years.130  In addition, high deployment rates indicate that Army and Marine Corps troops 
are also stretched thin.  This raises a critical question—what is the military’s true 
alternative to using contracted support?  Holding all other factors constant, the military 
would weigh the costs of increasing troop strength versus using contractors.  This 
suggests that the relevant alternative is more active duty troops, not more deployments of 
the active duty troops already in place.  Increasing the size of active forces to take these 
additional roles would be costly, both in funding and time.   
 
                                                 
130 Associated Press, “More National Guard Units may get second tours in Iraq,” [web-page] 
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2. Increasing the Size of the Military 
In researching the continued viability of the military’s all-volunteer force, John 
Warner and Beth Asch estimated the elasticity of enlistment supply.  Their research 
showed retention was very responsive to pay, citing that a “substantial but affordable pay 
increase would attract the necessary manpower.”131  Several additional studies confirmed 
the elasticity of the initial enlistment supply to exceed 1.0.132  Assuming the supply curve 
for first-term soldiers is elastic, we illustrate the effects of a larger military force.  Take, 
for example, an initial force of 100,000 volunteers, each with an average (cash) salary of 
$50,000.  Initially, this represents a total cost of $5 billion.  Next, imagine DoD wants to 
increase the size of the force by five percent, to 105,000 troops.  Assuming an elasticity 
of labor supply of 1.0, it will also need to raise wages by five percent, to $52,500.   Total 
compensation increases to about $5.5 billion, representing an increase of $512.5 million, 
or ten percent.  Note, however, what happens to the average cost per additional service 
member.  To gain an additional 5,000 volunteers, DoD must now increase its total labor 
cost by an average of $102,500 for each new volunteer gained – more than twice the 
initial $50,000 per soldier!  The extra $2,500 paid to each soldier provides an additional 
economic rent, or excess return, to each of the initial 50,000 soldiers who willingly 
volunteered before the increase.133  This example illustrates that increasing the size of the 
all-volunteer force is extremely costly for even a modest increase of 5,000 volunteers.  
Recall that, in the wake of increased ops-tempo, the Pentagon temporarily added 30,000 
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132 Ibid.   
133 See Jack Hirshleifer and David Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle 
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General Peter Schoomaker estimated that those new troops would cost $1.2 billion per 
10,000-soldier division.134  Furthermore, the Army also estimated that the increase would 
take up to four years.135   
3. The Sponsored Reserve System 
The sponsored reserve concept is being studied and used by military services in 
other countries, including Great Britain, Australia, and Canada.  The term “sponsored 
reserve” refers to a provision in a defense contract that requires the contractor to have a 
specified number of employees participate as military reservists.  Under the arrangement, 
these reservists may be mobilized and deployed to contingency operations as uniformed 
members, rather than civilian contractors.  Essentially, the system allows contractors 
performing peacetime operations to become activated reservists when they deploy 
overseas.136   
The sponsored reserve concept was recently highlighted in CBO’s 2005 Budget 
Options as a possibility to achieve near-term discretionary savings by reducing the 
number of active-duty personnel performing logistics functions, installation management, 
and physical security functions by 20 percent.137  Under the proposal, 20,000 active-duty 
personnel in those occupations would be replaced with the sponsored reservists over a 
period of four years. 
Under such a system, a contractor would essentially perform the same job but 
would act as a member of the military when deployed.  This would potentially bridge the 
gap between wholly privatized functions performed by contractors and functions 
performed by the military.  It also offers the advantage that deployed contractors would 
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fall under the military chain of command—ensuring better command and control and 
afford protections of military status.  Indeed, it is the lack of such regulations that has 
helped fuel widespread scrutiny of the entire industry.  Legally, the standing of private 
military agents in international law is problematic, and inconsistencies among statutes 
have become common.138   From DoD’s perspective, the advantage is the ability to better 
deal with force reductions and privatization challenges.  It also offers a way to deal with 
recruiting, training, and retention challenges.   
At the same time, implementing a sponsored reserve system raises some practical 
concerns.  Consider that it may require that additional compensation be paid to civilian 
contractor employees in order to compel them to military service. Moreover, what would 
prevent the employee from simply quitting and refusing to deploy?  After all, he/she is 
not bound by the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).  In order to get such an 
employee to agree to be bound by the UCMJ, he/she would have to be paid extra 
compensation while still a civilian employee to offset the risk of deployment and 
resulting dislocation.  This additional cost is likely to be very similar to the part-time pay 
given to reservists currently, especially if these sponsored reservists are expected to train 
as well.  Moreover, employees of peacetime contractors (for example, a weapons system 
supplier or maintenance provider) might not have the relevant skill sets to be deployed 
during war time without additional special training.  While employees of certain PMCs 
(such as those firms which specialize in armed security services) would clearly have 
valuable combat skills, such PMCs generally have little role during peacetime, and 
therefore would not be subject to such a sponsored reserve system.  In fact, many of the 
PMCs that have prominent roles now did not even exist before the current Iraq war, and 
certainly some of these PMCs are unlikely to have a prominent role (or any role at all) if 
the level of combat operations in the war on terror diminishes significantly.     
 
                                                 
138 See Blizzard, “Increasing Reliance on Contractors on the Battlefield,” 10.  Civilians who take part 
in hostilities may be regarded as combatants and are subject to attack and/or injury incidental to attack on 
military objectives.  Taking part in hostilities has note been clearly defined in the law of war but generally 
is not regarded as limited to civilians who engage in actual fighting.  Since civilians augment the Army in 
areas in which technical expertise is not available or is in short supply, the, in effect, become substitutes for 
military personnel who would have been combatants.   
 72
E. SUMMARY 
Since September 2001, Congress has appropriated nearly $430 billion to DoD and 
other U.S. agencies for military operations and reconstruction and stabilization activities 
supporting GWOT.  DoD has received approximately $386 billion to fund military 
operations, while nearly $44 billion was appropriated to agencies such as the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department for 
reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq ($34.5 billion) and Afghanistan ($9 
billion).139  GAO has produced three major reports on contractor support since mid-2003. 
The GAO assessment of the U.S. military’s use of contractors globally is generally 
positive, considering the magnitude and importance of services provided to forces.   More 
specifically, contractors and military commanders have worked together to meet military 
commanders’ needs, sometimes in very hazardous or difficult circumstances. For 
example, the LOGCAP contract is providing logistics support to more than 165,000 
soldiers and civilians under difficult security circumstances in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, 
and Djibouti, and DoD is generally pleased with the service the contractor is 
providing.140   
Many high-profile cases of alleged over-billing and under-delivery have emerged 
in Iraq but, in dollar terms, they typically represent only a small proportion of contract 
activity.  For example, a Defense Contracting Audit Agency (DCAA) audit report issued 
between February of 2003 and February of 2006 identified $2.1 billion in questioned 
costs and $1.4 billion in unsupported costs on Iraqi contracts.141  Even when combined, 
these costs, though they may appear large, represent only about one percent of total 
contract activity over the same time period.  Specifically, $311 billion was allocated to 
support these reconstruction and stabilization efforts between FY 2003 and FY 2006.  
                                                 
139 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Global War on Terrorism: Observations on Funding, 
Costs, and Future Commitments, 3. 
140 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contract Management: Contracting for Iraq 
Reconstruction and for Global Logistics Support, 7.  
141 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Iraq Contract Costs: DoD Consideration of Defense 
Contracting Audit Agency’s Findings. GAO-06-1132 (Washington, D.C., 2006); 2.  DCAA defines 
“questioned” costs as costs that are unacceptable for negotiating reasonable contract prices, and 
“unsupported” costs as costs for which the contractor has not provided sufficient documentation.  
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Furthermore, many of these questionable costs are indeed valid, however they may take 
several months to resolve or clarify.  Some of the more notable criticisms include 
allegations that Halliburton has used political influence to gain billion-dollar, multi-year 
contracts (basically a form of rent-seeking, as highlighted in Chapter III).   In 2005, PBS 
correspondent Martin Smith reported that an additional high-profile audit uncovered that 
KBR billed the government $1.8 billion in unsupported costs.142  While the issue has yet 
to be resolved, it should be noted that, as of 2005, the estimated value of the associated 
LOGCAP contract was $15 billion.143  Generally speaking, these DoD audits commonly 
cited inadequate planning and oversight as major weaknesses.  The GAO judged that 
contractor employment in Iraq had suffered from a lack of early planning and contractor 
involvement, poor oversight of service delivery and a failure to review contracts to ensure 
value for money.  In large measure, these problems can be traced to inadequate numbers 
of contracting personnel charged with oversight of several multi-billion dollar 
construction efforts.  According to one report, the U.S. contract management office in 
Baghdad employed a mere fourteen people to manage more than $18 billion in support 
and reconstruction projects. This helps explain publicized disagreements between the 
customer and vendor in Iraq.   
While a statement relating to the overall effectiveness of military contractors is 
difficult to make, it does appear that they have been able to fulfill their contractual 
obligations.  Although many challenges relating to oversight and legal status remain, it is 
clear that the military is getting what it needs.  In other words, these contractors are 
generally effective in their duties.  At the same time, the PMC’s ability to rapidly “surge” 
offers the military a key advantage.  Specifically, the PMCs primary strength lies in their 
ability to provide specialized employees in a short period of time. While some question 
the disparity in the wages of military forces versus private contractors, these arguments 
typically ignore (1) the composition of cash vs. non-cash compensation, (2) the advanced 
and specialized skills of a PMC’s labor force, and (3) the need for the PMC to pay a wage 
                                                 
142 PBS Frontline, “Private Warriors: Frequently Asked Questions.”  
143 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Logistics: High Level DoD Coordination is 
Needed to Further Improve the Management of the Army’s LOGCAP Contract. GAO-05-328 (Washington, 
D.C., 2005); 1. 
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which fully reflects the value of training and experience.  While PMCs often have a wider 
pool from which to select their employees, this does not in itself establish a comparative 
advantage in obtaining a well-qualified labor force.  The relevant comparison is still the 
price of an individual trained by the military versus the price of a comparatively qualified 
outside option.  Despite the fact that the PMC will not have to devote the same resources 
as the government to train its employees, it will still need to pay a wage that fully reflects 
the value of training and experience that might have been obtained from a state-
sponsored military organization.   
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER STUDY 
A. SUMMARY 
Defense spending is a primarily a question of resource allocation and, on a 
fundamental level, military outsourcing is akin to a company’s make-or-buy decision.  
Within the Pentagon, a renewed emphasis on market-based sourcing by the current 
Administration has nurtured a multi-billion dollar services industry and created an 
unprecedented role for private contractors.  In large part, these outsourcing efforts have 
been aimed at attaining cost savings and streamlining government.  At the same time, it 
should be emphasized that current commitments involved with ongoing GWOT 
operations represent a unique aspect of government contracting.   
Although PMCs have filled many of the military’s traditionally in-house roles 
including logistical support and weapons system maintenance, their current roles have 
been expanded to cover a greater number of diverse tasks.  Generally speaking, these are 
functions which the military does not have the capacity or capability to provide in-house.  
As a result, the majority of the current contingency-related contracts were not associated 
with a “textbook” A-76 cost study.  Rather, the reconstruction effort in Iraq is complex, 
costly, and challenging, in part due to an urgent need to begin and execute reconstruction 
projects in an unstable security environment.  Thus, the difficulties associated with 
contingency contracting are often incongruent with the traditional assumptions and 
guidelines regarding government outsourcing.   
Within a society, a common justification for government intervention is to 
provide public goods.  Within this framework, the provision of national defense is widely 
considered a public good.  But an important distinction economists make is between 
government funding of the public good, something with which few economists would 
disagree, and direct government production of the public good.  The government should 
not be the sole provider of a good or service unless there is a compelling reason to 
believe that the private sector will fail in that role.  Thus, provision of a public good can  
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be delivered in a way that harnesses the benefits of the free market.  The case for 
privatization is strong if private sector production of a given level of output is more 
efficient and more innovative.   
Within the military, outsourcing for traditionally in-house functions is rarely that 
clear cut, and Transaction Cost Economics can offer crucial additional insights to the 
make-or-buy decision.  In this analysis, key transaction costs include source selection, 
contract management, performance monitoring, and relationship-specific investments.  
Contracting for roles near the battlefield, for example, typically involves a non-
standardized service and must take place in a bilateral contract setting, suggesting a high 
degree of transactional complexity.   
Increasing reliance on PMCs during conflict also raises questions pertaining to the 
sovereign use of force.  Whereas private firms offer efficiency incentives which are 
maximized in competitive markets, public agencies, on the other hand, are better suited to 
provide “inherently governmental” or “sovereign” tasks.  Sovereign tasks are 
characterized by an additional attribute of probity.  Furthermore, agency theory suggests 
an inherent difference between profit-seeking contractors and civil servants.  The military 
commander will want the contractor to perform in a manner that will not hinder mission 
success.  In turn, tension will exist between a state-sponsored military and a PMC who is 
primarily driven by considerations of profit maximization.  Yet, the distinction between 
privately and publicly provided tasks is clearly open for interpretation and ultimately 
depends on the nature of the task to be provided.   
In some tasks, such as military leadership or tactical aviation, the characteristic of 
probity will remain of primary importance.  At the same time, there remain many services 
within government that can be provided by thriving, competitive markets—even near the 
battlefield—such as food services, janitorial duties, and reconstruction efforts.  More of a 
gray area exists, however, when contracting for private security, weapons support, and 
convoy duties.  Ultimately, contracting for these functions will require a tradeoff between 
the risks to mission accomplishment and the cost savings associated with private 
provision.   
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In evaluating the cost effectiveness of private contractors, two issues arise.  The 
first is the challenge in accurately calculating the public sector’s cost and the resulting 
savings if the function were to be privatized.  Such cost comparisons between public and 
private provision also must control for additional variables, such as the scenarios and 
environments in which contractors are employed.  In other words, contracting for vehicle 
maintenance services is much different than contracting security duties.   
The second important issue is the value of improved results. In other words, the 
“cost” argument should not be isolated—a complete analysis must also address the 
“effectiveness” of private contractors. As Schooner notes, the cost-savings argument for 
outsourcing is often not as compelling as the potential improvement from quality of 
service or flexibility.144  As previously highlighted, the ability of a PMC to provide the 
military with flexibility is a paramount consideration.  Furthermore, the cost effectiveness 
of contractors will depend on several factors including the type of service provided, the 
length of time, and the number of competing suppliers.  Without question, privatization 
and outsourcing can lead to sustained cost savings within the government.   
There are, however, important caveats.  Within the empirical framework of 
privatization and outsourcing, competition within markets is certainly an important 
precursor towards unleashing what Samuelson describes as the “tremendous vitality” of 
the free enterprise system.145   Additionally, the importance of effective oversight is 
underscored.  It would be unfair to accuse large reconstruction contractors, such as 
Parsons and Halliburton’s KBR, of being “war profiteers” without also addressing 
problems with the government’s oversight capability.   
B. CONCLUSION 
Privatization and outsourcing are vital components of a more efficient and cost-
effective government.  Efforts to cut “red tape” and streamline operations within 
government are lauded, and should certainly continue.  There remain important 
limitations, however.   
                                                 
144 Bianco and Anderson Forest, “Outsourcing War.” 
145 Paul A. Samuelson, Economics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1948); qtd in Shleifer, “State Versus 
Private Ownership,” 135. 
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An empirical view of outsourcing recognizes the importance of competition and 
oversight.  At the same time, contracting for roles near the battlefield may not fit within 
the traditional outsourcing guidelines.  Not only is the tactical environment characterized 
by uncertainty, complexity, and opportunism, but contracting for previously in-house 
functions also raises key questions about the sovereign use of force.  There is little 
argument that a gray area exists between those tasks deemed inherently governmental and 
those that are eligible to contract out.  Indeed, much of the current controversy is over 
those contractors who may redefine that boundary, like security guards, logistics 
providers, and weapons maintainers.  Further, the traditional definition of “sovereign” 
suggests an inherent tradeoff between the transactional characteristic of probity and cost 
savings.  Indeed, loyalty to the state and mission will remain important, but those 
considerations may be offset with the prospect of cost savings in a fiscally constrained 
environment.   
More recently, the vilification of PMCs by the media and some scholars has 
centered on their true cost to the taxpayer.  These cost-effectiveness arguments are 
frequently misleading and fail to address the advantages offered by a military contractor 
and/or the military’s alternative to using contracted support.  As is the case in past 
military operations, private companies can offer some important advantages to the 
military.  Contractors can afford DoD increased flexibility and capability that would 
otherwise be cost prohibitive to provide in-house.   
The inherent strength of contractors is their ability to provide specialized services 
in a short amount of time.  Because contractors need not make long-term commitments to 
their employees, they are in a better position to “surge” to meet a short-term demand for 
workers and then rapidly downsize later.  The QDR, the DoD-equivalent to a long-term 
business strategy, emphasizes that the future military will have to be agile, responsive, 
and adaptive with our military capabilities.146  In the past several years, DoD has focused 
on creating a lean, agile force designed to deploy quickly.  To the extent that PMCs 
                                                 
146 U.S. Department of Defense, QDR Provides Vectors for Defense Transformation [web-site] 
(Department of Defense, 2006); available from           
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/20060127_4033.html (accessed November 2006).   
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afford the government with improved service delivery and flexibility, contracting for 
services in a contingency environment is congruent with DoD’s transformation efforts.   
In addition, the military’s alternatives to using contracted support remains an 
important consideration.  A careful consideration of these alternatives demonstrates even 
more clearly that contractors are a cost effective use of tax dollars.  In the short-term, 
expanding the size of the reserve forces is not feasible, nor is increasing deployments of 
those reservists.  Furthermore, increasing active forces is costly, time consuming, and 
politically unpopular.   In summary, using contractors on the battlefield is controversial 
for many reasons, but cost effectiveness should not remain the primary concern.   
It is clear that the U.S. will continue to rely extensively on PMCs, in both wartime 
and peacetime, for the indefinite future.  In turn, steps should be taken to better formalize 
their use across all services.  Specifically, DoD uses contractors as part of the total force 
mix and recognizes the need to continue essential contractor services during crises, but it 
has not included them in operational and strategic planning.  With an increasing number 
of contractors currently working in Iraq, perhaps it should reconsider.  Finally, the 
utilization of “contractors on the battlefield” encompasses a host of contemporary topics.  
Using private contractors is controversial for several reasons including legal 
accountability, regulatory concerns, and ethical considerations. Ultimately, these legal 
and ethical ramifications often trump any cost concerns.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This research focused on some of the empirical issues related to outsourcing.  Yet 
much more work remains in the cost-effectiveness area.  In particular, a more quantitative 
analysis would address the utilization of contractors over a sustained period of time, 
using operations in present day Iraq and Afghanistan as a basis.   
In addition, more research directed at the PMC’s ability to “labor poach” highly 
qualified service members would provide policy recommendations on recruiting and 
retention methods.  A 2005 GAO report addressed concerns that attrition had increased in 
the wake of increased opportunities with private security providers.  Specifically, data  
 
 80
from the Defense Manpower Data Center show that military members in the affected 
specialties were leaving in the same proportions as before the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.147  
Nonetheless, data can only show trends in attrition rates, not explain why people 
are leaving the military or what they intend to do after leaving the military.  Furthermore, 
attrition rates are also influenced by several other factors, including the attraction of a 
strong civilian economy, high operational tempo, and various quality of life concerns.  
Nonetheless, many service officials remain leery about competing against PMCs for 
keeping their best and brightest servicemen.  During a November 2006 address to the 
Naval Postgraduate School, General Bryan Brown, Commander of U.S. Special 
Operations Command, expressed concern that lucrative salaries offered by private 
contractors continued to pose a challenge in recruiting and retaining some of the 
military’s most elite Special Forces troops.   
In the past decade, the defense industry has undergone extensive consolidation.  
While this has been more evident within the military equipment manufacturers, there are 
indications that similar mergers and acquisitions have been occurring among military 
service providers.  Additional research should address these changing market structures, 
with particular emphasis on implications for industry competitiveness.  Additionally, 
research could address a potential “dynamic endogeneity” problem: The government may 
actually reduce the competitiveness of a potential supplier industry when it awards 
contracts.  Often, firms that do not win a particular government contract do not have 
sufficient alternative customers for their services, and therefore either go out of business 
or merge with the firm that did win the contract.  Consequently, a previously competitive 
industry could, at a later date, become quite concentrated or even monopolized. 
Finally, is there danger of the military becoming too dependent upon contractors?  
From both inside and outside of the military, military analysts have expressed concern 
about the long-term effects that their use will have.  In particular, once certain functions 
are contracted out, it may be necessary that they continue to be provided for by the 
                                                 
147 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of 
Private Security Providers. 
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private market indefinitely. As highlighted in Chapter III, personnel cost savings 
subsequent to competitive sourcing appear to be “real and long lasting.”  However, this is 
clearly not always the case.  Increasing reliance on private sector to handle certain 
functions has reduced or eliminated the military’s ability to meet certain requirements 
internally.  Research into the long-term effects of military contracting provides an area 
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